From e0977a924118397dfe63c41768b9a3dac8e868fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Reactorcoremeltdown Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2026 12:57:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Let an admin delete a vault, behind their own password MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The web interface could create a vault and never remove one, so the only way to undo a mistake was the CLI. There is now a Delete link on every vault you administer, leading to a page that says what is about to go — owner, versions stored, grants pointing at it — and asks for your account password before it goes. The gate is re-authentication, not a confirmation checkbox. A session token is enough to read and write a vault; it should not be enough to erase every version of one, because a session is what an unlocked laptop leaves lying around. The one-time code is required too when the account has one enrolled. It lives in confirmDeletion, so the rule holds wherever deletion is reachable: DELETE /api/v1/databases/{id} now takes {password, totp?} and answers 401 without it, and keeporg db -delete prompts. That is a breaking change to the endpoint, which is why the server goes to 0.7.0 and the desktop clients to 0.4.0. An account that signs in only through an identity provider has no password to type. Rather than lock those deployments out of deleting anything, they confirm by typing the vault's exact name — the weaker gate, and deliberately the fallback. Deleting takes the record, its grants, every stored version and the key a merge vault left with the server, and tells the watchers over SSE. Copies already in people's mirror directories stay where they are: the server stops tracking a vault, it does not reach into anybody's home directory. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 --- cmd/keeporg/commands.go | 17 ++- docs/HANDOVER.md | 20 +++ docs/PROTOCOL.md | 10 +- internal/client/admin.go | 9 +- internal/server/admin.go | 90 +++++++++++-- internal/server/delete_test.go | 237 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ internal/server/pages.go | 65 ++++++++- internal/server/server.go | 2 + internal/server/web.go | 70 ++++++++++ packaging/deb/client/changelog | 6 + packaging/deb/server/changelog | 6 + versions.mk | 10 +- 12 files changed, 521 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) create mode 100644 internal/server/delete_test.go diff --git a/cmd/keeporg/commands.go b/cmd/keeporg/commands.go index 19b9ea2..0479ed9 100644 --- a/cmd/keeporg/commands.go +++ b/cmd/keeporg/commands.go @@ -412,7 +412,8 @@ func cmdDB(ctx context.Context, args []string) error { "merge strategy: merge, server-wins, client-wins or manual") id := fs.String("id", "", "database id, for -strategy, -rename or -delete") rename := fs.String("rename", "", "new name for -id") - del := fs.Bool("delete", false, "delete the database given by -id") + del := fs.Bool("delete", false, + "delete the database given by -id, every stored version of it included") storePassword := fs.Bool("store-password", false, "give the server this vault's password so it can merge the vault") forgetPassword := fs.Bool("forget-password", false, @@ -463,7 +464,19 @@ func cmdDB(ctx context.Context, args []string) error { } fmt.Printf("%s now uses %s\n", db.Name, db.MergeStrategy) case *id != "" && *del: - if err := api.DeleteDatabase(ctx, *id); err != nil { + password, perr := readPassword("Your account password: ") + if perr != nil { + return perr + } + err := api.DeleteDatabase(ctx, *id, password, "") + if client.Code(err) == "totp_required" || client.Code(err) == "totp_invalid" { + code, cerr := prompt("One-time code: ") + if cerr != nil { + return cerr + } + err = api.DeleteDatabase(ctx, *id, password, code) + } + if err != nil { return err } fmt.Println("deleted on the server; local files were left in place") diff --git a/docs/HANDOVER.md b/docs/HANDOVER.md index d23e8b5..c17b34c 100644 --- a/docs/HANDOVER.md +++ b/docs/HANDOVER.md @@ -353,6 +353,7 @@ browsing, by design. | Page | What it does | | --- | --- | | `/web/vaults` | the vaults you can reach, the create-a-vault form, your own account password | +| `/web/vaults/{id}/delete` | what deleting a vault destroys, and the password that confirms it | | `/web/groups` | the group tree you can see, and a form to add a group inside one you administer | | `/web/groups/{id}` | one group: members and their roles, the vaults it reaches and where that access comes from, grants given and revoked, deletion | | `/web/users` | the accounts you may see; for a server administrator, disable, enable, clear the second factor, promote, demote, delete | @@ -393,6 +394,25 @@ No page carries any JavaScript. Each control is its own small form with the CSRF token and one action in it, which is what makes the interface work in a locked-down browser and keeps its attack surface down to that token. +**Deleting a vault asks for the password again.** Every other control on +these pages is undoable or additive; this one erases every stored version of +a file. A live session is what an unlocked laptop leaves lying around, so the +confirmation page states what is about to go — owner, versions, grants — and +takes the administrator's own account password, plus their one-time code when +they have one. The same rule covers the API and `keeporg db -delete`, because +it lives in `confirmDeletion` rather than in the page. + +An account that signs in only through an identity provider has no password to +type. Refusing those accounts would mean a deployment where nobody can delete +anything, so they confirm by typing the vault's exact name. That is a weaker +gate, and it is deliberately the fallback rather than the rule. + +Deleting takes the record, the grants pointing at it, every stored version +and — for a merge vault — the key the server held. It does not touch the +copies in people's mirror directories: the server stops tracking the vault, it +does not reach into anybody's home directory. Clients are told over SSE, so +they stop expecting the file rather than discovering it at the next save. + Creating a vault is one transaction: the server builds an empty KDBX 4 database, encrypts it with the password from the form, stores it as version 1, and — for a merge vault — wraps the password under the master key. If the diff --git a/docs/PROTOCOL.md b/docs/PROTOCOL.md index b23aa29..9e29971 100644 --- a/docs/PROTOCOL.md +++ b/docs/PROTOCOL.md @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ the group named or any group above it. | DELETE | `/api/v1/groups/{id}/members/{user}` | – | group admin | | POST | `/api/v1/databases` | `{name, owner_group_id, merge_strategy}` | group admin of the owner | | PATCH | `/api/v1/databases/{id}` | `{name?, merge_strategy?}` | database admin | -| DELETE | `/api/v1/databases/{id}` | – | database admin; deletes every stored version | +| DELETE | `/api/v1/databases/{id}` | `{password, totp?}` | database admin, re-proving their own password; deletes every stored version | | POST | `/api/v1/grants` | `{group_id, database_id, perm}` | database admin | | DELETE | `/api/v1/grants` | `?group_id=&database_id=` | database admin | | POST | `/api/v1/invites` | `{group_id, role, ttl_hours, max_uses}` | group admin | @@ -131,6 +131,14 @@ Switching to `merge` requires a stored key and is otherwise refused with `400`. `perm` is one of `read`, `write`, `admin`. `role` is `member` or `admin`. +Deleting a database is the one call that asks for credentials again. A +session token is enough to read and write a vault and not enough to destroy +every version of it, so the body carries the caller's own account password, +and `totp` as well when that account has a second factor enrolled — the +server answers `401 totp_required` when it is missing. An account that signs +in only through an identity provider has no password to send and passes +`{"confirm_name": ""}` instead. + An account `action` is one of `disable`, `enable`, `promote`, `demote`, `clear-totp` or `delete`. `disable` and `delete` also revoke every session that account holds. The three that would lock the caller out — `disable`, diff --git a/internal/client/admin.go b/internal/client/admin.go index 36ee7b6..7ab3a1f 100644 --- a/internal/client/admin.go +++ b/internal/client/admin.go @@ -103,8 +103,13 @@ func (a *API) RenameDatabase(ctx context.Context, dbID, name string) (*Database, map[string]string{"name": name}, &out) } -func (a *API) DeleteDatabase(ctx context.Context, dbID string) error { - return a.do(ctx, http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/databases/"+url.PathEscape(dbID), nil, nil) +// DeleteDatabase removes a database and every version of it stored on the +// server. The caller's own account password is required, and the one-time +// code too when that account has one enrolled; the server answers +// totp_required when it is missing. +func (a *API) DeleteDatabase(ctx context.Context, dbID, password, totp string) error { + return a.do(ctx, http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/databases/"+url.PathEscape(dbID), + map[string]string{"password": password, "totp": totp}, nil) } func (a *API) SetGrant(ctx context.Context, groupID, dbID, perm string) error { diff --git a/internal/server/admin.go b/internal/server/admin.go index 2b7e426..cfc1328 100644 --- a/internal/server/admin.go +++ b/internal/server/admin.go @@ -19,6 +19,23 @@ var errForbidden = errors.New("forbidden") // may do what, and the only durable way to make them agree is for both to // call the same function. +// denyAuth answers a request that failed to re-prove its credentials. The +// cases stay distinct so a client knows to prompt for the factor it is +// missing rather than reporting a flat refusal. +func denyAuth(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) { + switch { + case errors.Is(err, errTOTPRequired): + fail(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "totp_required", "second factor required") + case errors.Is(err, errTOTPInvalid): + fail(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "totp_invalid", "second factor rejected") + case errors.Is(err, errBadCredentials): + fail(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "bad_credentials", + "your own account password is required for this") + default: + deny(w, err) + } +} + // deny maps a domain error onto a response. func deny(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) { switch { @@ -457,29 +474,86 @@ func (s *Server) handlePatchDatabase(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, u * writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, out) } -func (s *Server) handleDeleteDatabase(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, u *store.User) { - id := r.PathValue("id") - var watchers []string +// errConfirmName is the answer when an account with no password of its own +// did not type the name of the thing it is about to destroy. +var errConfirmName = errors.New("type the name exactly to confirm") + +// confirmDeletion re-proves who the caller is before something irreversible. +// Holding a session is enough to read and write a vault; it is not enough to +// destroy every version of one, because a session is what an unlocked laptop +// leaves lying around. +// +// An account that signs in only through an identity provider has no password +// to type. Refusing those accounts would mean a deployment where nobody can +// delete anything, so they confirm by typing the exact name instead. That is +// a weaker gate and it is deliberately the fallback, not the rule. +func confirmDeletion(st *store.State, u *store.User, name, password, totpCode, typed string) error { + target := st.Users[u.ID] + if target == nil { + return errBadCredentials + } + if target.PassHash == "" { + if strings.TrimSpace(typed) != name { + return errConfirmName + } + return nil + } + _, err := checkPassword(st, target.Username, password, totpCode) + return err +} + +// deleteDatabase removes a database, its grants and every stored version of +// the file. Clients keep whatever they already have on disk: the server can +// stop tracking a vault, but it has no business reaching into somebody's +// home directory. +func (s *Server) deleteDatabase(u *store.User, id, password, totpCode, typed string) (string, error) { + var ( + name string + watchers []string + ) err := s.st.Update(func(st *store.State) error { - if st.Databases[id] == nil { + db := st.Databases[id] + if db == nil { return errors.New("no such database") } if st.DatabasePerm(u.ID, id) != store.PermAdmin { return errForbidden } + if cerr := confirmDeletion(st, u, db.Name, password, totpCode, typed); cerr != nil { + return cerr + } + name = db.Name + // Taken before the delete: the people to tell are the ones who are + // about to stop having access. watchers = st.Watchers(id) delete(st.Databases, id) st.Grants = filterGrants(st.Grants, func(g store.Grant) bool { return g.DatabaseID != id }) return nil }) if err != nil { - deny(w, err) - return + return "", err } - if err := s.blobs.Forget(id); err != nil { - s.log.Printf("delete blobs for %s: %v", id, err) + if ferr := s.blobs.Forget(id); ferr != nil { + s.log.Printf("delete blobs for %s: %v", id, ferr) } s.hub.Publish(watchers, Event{Type: EventChanged, DatabaseID: id}) + s.log.Printf("%s deleted database %q (%s) and every stored version", u.Username, name, id) + return name, nil +} + +func (s *Server) handleDeleteDatabase(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, u *store.User) { + var req struct { + Password string `json:"password"` + TOTP string `json:"totp"` + Confirm string `json:"confirm_name"` + } + if r.ContentLength > 0 && !readJSON(w, r, &req) { + return + } + if _, err := s.deleteDatabase(u, r.PathValue("id"), req.Password, req.TOTP, req.Confirm); err != nil { + denyAuth(w, err) + return + } writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "deleted"}) } diff --git a/internal/server/delete_test.go b/internal/server/delete_test.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..00b1800 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/server/delete_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +package server + +import ( + "net/http" + "net/url" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "strings" + "testing" + "time" + + "cc.tiredsysadmin.keeporg/internal/secret" + "cc.tiredsysadmin.keeporg/internal/store" + "cc.tiredsysadmin.keeporg/internal/totp" +) + +// blobsExist reports whether the server still keeps any version of a +// database on disk. +func (h *harness) blobsExist(dbID string) bool { + h.t.Helper() + _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(h.dataDir, "blobs", dbID)) + return err == nil +} + +func TestWebDeletesAVaultOnlyWithTheAdminsPassword(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + b := newBrowser(t, h) + csrf := b.signIn() + admin, _, _ := h.login("admin", adminPassword, "") + id := h.makeVault(admin, "Doomed") + if !h.blobsExist(id) { + t.Fatal("the new vault has no stored version") + } + // A grant so the delete has something to clean up besides the record. + if status, body := h.call("POST", "/api/v1/grants", admin, map[string]any{ + "group_id": "everyone", "database_id": id, "perm": "read", + }); status != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("grant: %d %v", status, body) + } + + status, page := b.get("/web/vaults/" + id + "/delete") + if status != http.StatusOK || !strings.Contains(page, "Delete Doomed.kdbx?") { + t.Fatalf("the confirmation page = %d\n%s", status, page) + } + if !strings.Contains(page, "Your account password") { + t.Fatalf("the page does not ask for a password:\n%s", page) + } + + _, page = b.post("/web/vaults/"+id+"/delete", url.Values{ + "csrf": {csrf}, "password": {"not-the-password"}}) + if !strings.Contains(page, "not your account password") { + t.Fatalf("a wrong password was not reported:\n%s", page) + } + h.srv.Store().Read(func(st *store.State) { + if st.Databases[id] == nil { + t.Fatal("the vault was deleted on a wrong password") + } + }) + if !h.blobsExist(id) { + t.Fatal("the stored versions went on a wrong password") + } + + _, page = b.post("/web/vaults/"+id+"/delete", url.Values{ + "csrf": {csrf}, "password": {adminPassword}}) + if !strings.Contains(page, "Deleted Doomed") { + t.Fatalf("delete:\n%s", page) + } + if strings.Contains(page, "Doomed.kdbx") { + t.Fatal("the deleted vault is still listed") + } + h.srv.Store().Read(func(st *store.State) { + if st.Databases[id] != nil { + t.Fatal("the record survived") + } + for _, g := range st.Grants { + if g.DatabaseID == id { + t.Fatal("a grant outlived the vault") + } + } + }) + if h.blobsExist(id) { + t.Fatal("the stored versions outlived the vault") + } +} + +// Write access is not administration: it must not reach the page, and must +// not delete even with the right password. +func TestWebDeleteIsRefusedWithoutAdminRights(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + b := newBrowser(t, h) + csrf := b.signIn() + admin, _, _ := h.login("admin", adminPassword, "") + id := h.makeVault(admin, "Theirs") + + h.join(b.invite(csrf, "everyone", "member"), "wally", "wally-password-1") + if status, body := h.call("POST", "/api/v1/grants", admin, map[string]any{ + "group_id": "everyone", "database_id": id, "perm": "write", + }); status != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("grant: %d %v", status, body) + } + + w := newBrowser(t, h) + wCSRF := w.signInAs("wally", "wally-password-1") + _, page := w.get("/web/vaults/" + id + "/delete") + if !strings.Contains(page, "you do not administer it") { + t.Fatalf("a writer reached the delete page:\n%s", page) + } + _, page = w.post("/web/vaults/"+id+"/delete", url.Values{ + "csrf": {wCSRF}, "password": {"wally-password-1"}}) + if !strings.Contains(page, "you do not administer it") { + t.Fatalf("a writer's delete was not refused:\n%s", page) + } + h.srv.Store().Read(func(st *store.State) { + if st.Databases[id] == nil { + t.Fatal("a writer deleted the vault") + } + }) + // The vault list offers them no way in either. + _, page = w.get("/web/vaults") + if strings.Contains(page, "/delete") { + t.Fatalf("a writer was offered a delete link:\n%s", page) + } +} + +func TestAPIDeleteNeedsThePassword(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + admin, _, _ := h.login("admin", adminPassword, "") + id := h.makeVault(admin, "By API") + + status, body := h.call("DELETE", "/api/v1/databases/"+id, admin, nil) + if status != http.StatusUnauthorized || body["code"] != "bad_credentials" { + t.Fatalf("delete with no password: %d %v", status, body) + } + status, body = h.call("DELETE", "/api/v1/databases/"+id, admin, + map[string]string{"password": "wrong"}) + if status != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Fatalf("delete with a wrong password: %d %v", status, body) + } + h.srv.Store().Read(func(st *store.State) { + if st.Databases[id] == nil { + t.Fatal("the vault went without a password") + } + }) + if status, body = h.call("DELETE", "/api/v1/databases/"+id, admin, + map[string]string{"password": adminPassword}); status != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("delete with the password: %d %v", status, body) + } + if h.blobsExist(id) { + t.Fatal("the stored versions outlived the vault") + } +} + +func TestDeleteAsksForTheSecondFactorToo(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + admin, _, _ := h.login("admin", adminPassword, "") + id := h.makeVault(admin, "Guarded") + + status, body := h.call("POST", "/api/v1/auth/totp/enroll", admin, nil) + if status != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("enroll: %d %v", status, body) + } + sec := body["secret"].(string) + code, err := totp.Code(sec, time.Now()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if status, body = h.call("POST", "/api/v1/auth/totp/confirm", admin, + map[string]string{"code": code}); status != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("confirm: %d %v", status, body) + } + + if status, body = h.call("DELETE", "/api/v1/databases/"+id, admin, + map[string]string{"password": adminPassword}); status != http.StatusUnauthorized || + body["code"] != "totp_required" { + t.Fatalf("delete without a code: %d %v", status, body) + } + code, _ = totp.Code(sec, time.Now()) + if status, body = h.call("DELETE", "/api/v1/databases/"+id, admin, + map[string]string{"password": adminPassword, "totp": code}); status != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("delete with the code: %d %v", status, body) + } +} + +// An account that only ever signs in through an identity provider has no +// password to re-type, so it confirms with the vault's name instead. +func TestSingleSignOnAccountConfirmsByName(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + admin, _, _ := h.login("admin", adminPassword, "") + id := h.makeVault(admin, "Federated") + + sso := &store.User{ID: secret.ID(), Username: "sso", OIDCIssuer: "https://id.example.com", + OIDCSubject: "abc", ServerAdmin: true, CreatedAt: time.Now()} + if err := h.srv.Store().Update(func(st *store.State) error { + st.Users[sso.ID] = sso + return nil + }); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + if _, err := h.srv.deleteDatabase(sso, id, "", "", ""); err != errConfirmName { + t.Fatalf("delete with nothing typed = %v", err) + } + if _, err := h.srv.deleteDatabase(sso, id, "", "", "federated"); err != errConfirmName { + t.Fatalf("delete with the wrong case = %v", err) + } + if _, err := h.srv.deleteDatabase(sso, id, "", "", "Federated"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("delete with the name typed = %v", err) + } + h.srv.Store().Read(func(st *store.State) { + if st.Databases[id] != nil { + t.Fatal("the vault survived a confirmed delete") + } + }) +} + +// Deleting a vault tells everyone who could reach it, so their client stops +// expecting the file rather than finding out at the next save. +func TestDeleteNotifiesTheWatchers(t *testing.T) { + h := newHarness(t) + admin, _, _ := h.login("admin", adminPassword, "") + id := h.makeVault(admin, "Watched") + + sub, events := h.srv.hub.Subscribe("admin") + defer h.srv.hub.Unsubscribe(sub) + if _, err := h.srv.deleteDatabase(&store.User{ID: "admin", Username: "admin"}, + id, adminPassword, "", ""); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + select { + case ev := <-events: + if ev.DatabaseID != id || ev.Type != EventChanged { + t.Fatalf("event = %+v", ev) + } + case <-time.After(2 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("no event reached a watcher") + } +} diff --git a/internal/server/pages.go b/internal/server/pages.go index cd8fbc9..be88a00 100644 --- a/internal/server/pages.go +++ b/internal/server/pages.go @@ -71,8 +71,10 @@ a{color:var(--accent)} td form{display:inline;margin:0} td button{width:auto;margin:0 .25rem .25rem 0;padding:.3rem .5rem;font-size:.8rem;font-weight:500; background:transparent;color:var(--accent);border:1px solid var(--line)} -td button.danger{color:#b02a37} -@media(prefers-color-scheme:dark){td button.danger{color:#f2b8c0}} +td button.danger,a.danger{color:#b02a37} +button.destroy{background:#b02a37} +@media(prefers-color-scheme:dark){td button.danger,a.danger{color:#f2b8c0} +button.destroy{background:#a3313c}} .inline{display:flex;gap:.6rem;align-items:flex-end;flex-wrap:wrap;margin:0} .inline>div{flex:1 1 9rem} .inline label{margin-top:0} @@ -133,7 +135,7 @@ var vaultsTmpl = template.Must(template.Must(pages.Clone()).Parse(` {{if .Notice}}

{{.Notice}}

{{end}} {{if .Vaults}}
- + {{range .Vaults}} @@ -141,6 +143,7 @@ var vaultsTmpl = template.Must(template.Must(pages.Clone()).Parse(` + {{end}}
VaultAccessOn conflictVersionLast saved
VaultAccessOn conflictVersionLast saved
{{.Name}}.kdbx{{.Strategy}} {{.Version}} {{.Updated}}{{if .By}}
by {{.By}}{{end}}		{{if eq .Perm "admin"}}Delete{{end}}
{{else}} @@ -201,6 +204,51 @@ Changing it signs out your other sessions.

{{end}}`)) +var deleteVaultTmpl = template.Must(template.Must(pages.Clone()).Parse(` +{{define "body"}} +{{with .V}} +

Delete {{.Name}}.kdbx?

+

This cannot be undone. Back to your vaults

+{{end}} +{{if .Error}}

{{.Error}}

{{end}} +{{with .V}} +
+ + + + + +
Owned by{{.Group}}
Versions stored{{.Version}}
Last saved{{.Updated}}
Groups granted access{{.Grants}}
+ +

Every stored version of this file is erased from the server, +along with the grants that point at it. Copies already in people's mirror +directories stay on their computers: the server stops tracking the vault, it +does not reach into anybody's home directory. If the vault is merged here, +the key the server holds goes with it.

+ +
Confirm it is you +
+ +{{if .NeedsName}} + + +

You sign in through single sign-on, so there is no password here +to ask for.

+{{else}} + + +{{if .NeedsTOTP}} + + +{{end}} +

Not the vault's password — the one you signed in with.

+{{end}} + +
+
+{{end}} +{{end}}`)) + var doneTmpl = template.Must(template.Must(pages.Clone()).Parse(` {{define "body"}}

{{.Title}}

{{.Message}}

{{end}}`)) @@ -227,6 +275,17 @@ func (s *Server) renderVaults(w http.ResponseWriter, sess *webSession, errMsg, n render(w, vaultsTmpl, d) } +func (s *Server) renderDeleteVault(w http.ResponseWriter, sess *webSession, id, errMsg string) { + v := s.deleteVaultView(sess.user, id) + if v == nil { + s.renderVaults(w, sess, "There is no such vault, or you do not administer it.", "") + return + } + d := s.shell(sess, "Delete vault", "Vaults") + d["V"], d["Error"] = v, errMsg + render(w, deleteVaultTmpl, d) +} + func (s *Server) renderDone(w http.ResponseWriter, title, msg string) { render(w, doneTmpl, map[string]any{"Title": title, "Message": msg}) } diff --git a/internal/server/server.go b/internal/server/server.go index d3e6fd3..e63e85b 100644 --- a/internal/server/server.go +++ b/internal/server/server.go @@ -192,6 +192,8 @@ func (s *Server) routes() { m.HandleFunc("GET /web/vaults", s.webPage(s.handleWebVaults)) m.HandleFunc("POST /web/vaults", s.webForm(s.handleWebCreateVault)) m.HandleFunc("POST /web/password", s.webForm(s.handleWebChangePassword)) + m.HandleFunc("GET /web/vaults/{id}/delete", s.webPage(s.handleWebDeleteVaultPage)) + m.HandleFunc("POST /web/vaults/{id}/delete", s.webForm(s.handleWebDeleteVault)) m.HandleFunc("GET /web/groups", s.webPage(s.handleWebGroups)) m.HandleFunc("POST /web/groups", s.webForm(s.handleWebCreateGroup)) m.HandleFunc("GET /web/groups/{id}", s.webPage(s.handleWebGroup)) diff --git a/internal/server/web.go b/internal/server/web.go index 7fdcda5..f354fde 100644 --- a/internal/server/web.go +++ b/internal/server/web.go @@ -217,6 +217,76 @@ func (s *Server) handleWebChangePassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, } } +// webDeleteVault is what the confirmation page shows before a vault goes. +type webDeleteVault struct { + ID string + Name string + Group string + Version int64 + Updated string + Grants int + // NeedsName marks an account with no password of its own, which confirms + // by typing the vault's name instead; NeedsTOTP marks one with a second + // factor enrolled. + NeedsName bool + NeedsTOTP bool +} + +// deleteVaultView gathers what is about to be destroyed, or nil when the +// caller does not administer the vault. +func (s *Server) deleteVaultView(u *store.User, id string) *webDeleteVault { + var out *webDeleteVault + s.st.Read(func(st *store.State) { + db := st.Databases[id] + if db == nil || st.DatabasePerm(u.ID, id) != store.PermAdmin { + return + } + v := &webDeleteVault{ID: db.ID, Name: db.Name, Version: db.Version, Updated: "never"} + if db.Version > 0 { + v.Updated = db.UpdatedAt.UTC().Format("2006-01-02 15:04 UTC") + } + if g := st.Groups[db.OwnerGroupID]; g != nil { + v.Group = g.Name + } + for _, gr := range st.Grants { + if gr.DatabaseID == id { + v.Grants++ + } + } + if target := st.Users[u.ID]; target != nil { + v.NeedsName = target.PassHash == "" + v.NeedsTOTP = target.TOTPConfirmed + } + out = v + }) + return out +} + +func (s *Server) handleWebDeleteVaultPage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess *webSession) { + s.renderDeleteVault(w, sess, r.PathValue("id"), "") +} + +func (s *Server) handleWebDeleteVault(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, sess *webSession) { + id := r.PathValue("id") + name, err := s.deleteDatabase(sess.user, id, r.FormValue("password"), + r.FormValue("totp"), r.FormValue("confirm_name")) + switch { + case errors.Is(err, errTOTPRequired): + s.renderDeleteVault(w, sess, id, "Enter your one-time code as well.") + case errors.Is(err, errTOTPInvalid): + s.renderDeleteVault(w, sess, id, "That one-time code was rejected.") + case errors.Is(err, errBadCredentials): + s.renderDeleteVault(w, sess, id, "That is not your account password.") + case errors.Is(err, errConfirmName): + s.renderDeleteVault(w, sess, id, "Type the vault's name exactly as it is shown.") + case err != nil: + s.renderDeleteVault(w, sess, id, humanError(err)) + default: + s.renderVaults(w, sess, "", "Deleted "+name+" and every version of it. "+ + "Copies already on people's computers stay where they are.") + } +} + // humanError keeps internal wording out of the browser. func humanError(err error) string { if errors.Is(err, errForbidden) { diff --git a/packaging/deb/client/changelog b/packaging/deb/client/changelog index 40f1bd6..3542a87 100644 --- a/packaging/deb/client/changelog +++ b/packaging/deb/client/changelog @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +keeporg (0.4.0) unstable; urgency=medium + + * keeporg db -delete now asks for your account password + + -- tiredsysadmin Fri, 30 Oct 2026 12:54:05 +0100 + keeporg (0.3.0) unstable; urgency=medium * New `keeporg passwd` command, which changes the account password. diff --git a/packaging/deb/server/changelog b/packaging/deb/server/changelog index a2a6f6f..225b585 100644 --- a/packaging/deb/server/changelog +++ b/packaging/deb/server/changelog @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +keeporgd (0.7.0) unstable; urgency=medium + + * Deleting a database now requires the caller's own account password + + -- tiredsysadmin Fri, 30 Oct 2026 12:54:05 +0100 + keeporgd (0.6.0) unstable; urgency=medium * Add the administration pages: groups and their members, accounts, diff --git a/versions.mk b/versions.mk index 1d76225..c6ccc1f 100644 --- a/versions.mk +++ b/versions.mk @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ # Single source of truth for all platform versions (semver). # Bump with: make bump PLATFORM= PART= -VERSION_SERVER := 0.6.0 -VERSION_LINUX := 0.3.0 -VERSION_MACOS := 0.3.0 -VERSION_WINDOWS := 0.3.0 -VERSION_BSD := 0.3.0 +VERSION_SERVER := 0.7.0 +VERSION_LINUX := 0.4.0 +VERSION_MACOS := 0.4.0 +VERSION_WINDOWS := 0.4.0 +VERSION_BSD := 0.4.0 VERSION_ANDROID := 0.2.0 # Monotonic Android versionCode, never decreases. ANDROID_VERSION_CODE := 2