3a499532f3e666d9fe6cd94d770f019825b082f2
5
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 root
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7eed722ff5 |
Fix single sign-on from the web, and make passwords changeable
Why: two questions about operating this turned up two gaps. "Where do I get the admin password" had no answer once the line scrolled out of the log, and "how do I set up OIDC" ran straight into a sign-in link that could not work. What: - /oidc/login with no parameters now signs a browser in and ends in a session cookie. It previously required the user code of a waiting client, so the link on the web sign-in page always failed. With a code it still approves a device, and the two paths no longer overlap: an empty user code matches no pending device. - POST /api/v1/auth/password, `keeporg passwd`, and a form on /web/vaults. Changing a password requires the current one, and the one-time code when a second factor is enrolled, and revokes that account's other sessions. Until now nothing could change a password, which made the advice printed at first start impossible to follow. - keeporgd -reset-admin, for when that first password was not kept: a new one printed once, any second factor cleared, sessions revoked. It writes the state document directly and says to stop the server first. - The client read stdin through a new buffered reader per prompt, so the first prompt swallowed the rest and anything asking twice could not be scripted. One shared reader now. A prompt for a password being set no longer reads $KEEPORG_PASSWORD either; that variable holds the password you sign in with, and taking it here would have set the new password to the old one. - HANDOVER gains a first-sign-in section and an OIDC setup section covering the redirect URI, the config block, both entry points and how an identity becomes an account. Proved: OIDC now has tests, against a stub provider that serves discovery, authorization, token and userinfo. They cover the web sign-in that was broken, device approval, linking an existing account by username, the refusal when auto_create is off, and a forged callback state. Eight more cover the password change. Checked by hand with the real binaries: the first-start password logs once and works, -reset-admin replaces it while the old one stops working, and `keeporg passwd` changes it from a pipe. Server 0.5.0, desktop clients 0.3.0. |
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root
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9c459909c3 |
Take the master key from KEEPORG_MASTER_KEY_FILE
Why: the usual way to hand a secret to a container is to mount it as a file and name the path in the environment. Compose, swarm and Kubernetes all do it that way, and it keeps the key out of the process environment and off any disk the container can write. What: the master key is now looked for in KEEPORG_MASTER_KEY, then KEEPORG_MASTER_KEY_FILE, then the configured master_key_file. A secret file may hold base64, with or without padding or a trailing newline, or exactly 32 raw bytes, because secret stores produce both. Only the configured path is ever created, which is what keeps a plain package install working with no setup. The two environment variables name a key something else owns, so a missing one is reported and vault creation refused. Minting a replacement there would be worse than failing: it opens none of the existing vaults, and the mistake would otherwise surface one failed merge at a time. The compose example now provisions the key as a real secret rather than an environment variable, and the Dockerfile and README show the same. Neither names a version any more, so they stop drifting as the server is bumped. Proved: unit tests for every source and precedence, all four accepted encodings, and that a missing secret writes nothing anywhere. In real containers: a podman secret carrying base64 survives a stop and start with "1 vault keys available for merging" and merges a stale push afterwards; a secret holding 32 raw bytes creates a vault; and a secret that failed to mount is named in the startup log, with vault creation answering with the three places a key may come from. |
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root
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dacfe20494 |
Add a container image for the server
Why: the server is a single static binary with no dependencies, so its container should be nothing but that binary. Shipping one also makes the master key easy to lose, which needed handling rather than documenting. What: - Dockerfile: two stages, runtime is scratch plus the binary and a CA bundle for reaching an OIDC provider, running as uid 65532. About 9 MB. The build stage copies only go.mod, cmd/keeporgd and internal, so client or docs changes do not invalidate it. - The image has no shell, so HEALTHCHECK runs `keeporgd -healthcheck`, a new flag that probes /healthz on the configured address and exits non-zero with a reason. podman needs --format docker to keep the healthcheck at all, which the Makefile passes when it picks podman. - New -master-key-file flag, so a mounted secret works without a config file. - The server now checks at startup whether the master key still opens the stored vault keys, and says so. Without it, a container restarted without its key discovers the problem one failed merge at a time. - make docker, docker-run and docker-save; a compose example with read_only, cap_drop ALL and no-new-privileges. - The client and the server now version independently, so their Debian changelogs are split per package and `make changelog` takes PKG=. Server 0.3.0; the clients stay at 0.2.0. Proved: built with podman and run. The container serves /healthz and /web, its own healthcheck reports healthy, and a vault created through it was edited from the same base by keepassxc-cli twice, merged by the server into version 3, and read back with both entries intact. Restarted without the master key it warns "1 of 1 stored vault keys do not open with this master key" and answers a merging push with 409 merge_failed, leaving the vault untouched; restored, it logs "1 vault keys available for merging" and merges again. The same key supplied through -master-key-file from a mounted file works identically. Both .deb packages build with their own changelog, and make check is clean. |
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root
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a9308a3e89 |
Merge concurrent saves on the server, with vaults created from the web
Why: the point of a sync server is that two people can work at once. Picking a winner was all this one could do while it could not read a vault. What, end to end: - A vault is created at /web or with `keeporg vault -create`: the server builds an empty KDBX 4 file, encrypts it with the password from the form, and stores it as version 1. An existing database can adopt a stored key with `keeporg db -id <id> -store-password`, which is verified against the stored file before it is accepted. - A stale push to a `merge` vault is no longer refused. The server opens the stored version and the pushed one in memory, folds them together, and stores the re-encrypted result. Clients push as usual and pull what comes back. Any failure answers 409 merge_failed and the client keeps its copy aside, so a failed merge still loses nothing. - At rest: vault contents stay KDBX-encrypted as always. A merge vault's password is kept AES-256-GCM-wrapped under a master key that lives outside the data directory, bound to the vault id, never returned by the API. A stolen data directory is ciphertext; a stolen data directory plus the master key is not. The server runs without a master key and simply refuses to create or merge vaults. This moves the server inside the trust boundary for vaults it can merge, which is inherent to merging and is stated plainly in the README, the handover notes and the web form itself. Key-less strategies are unchanged and remain the default for a database created without a password. Proved: two clients editing the same version are merged rather than refused, the newer edit of one entry wins, a merge failure leaves the stored vault untouched, `merge` is refused without a stored key, the wrapped key never appears in state.json or the API, and the web interface rejects a form without its CSRF token, withholds its cookie over plain http, and only offers groups the user administers. Checked by hand against the real thing: a vault created in a browser, edited by keepassxc-cli on two sides from the same version, merged by the server, and both entries read back out with keepassxc-cli. make check, make test-race, android lint and both .deb builds are clean. |
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root
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8bbb3179a1 |
Add KeepOrg sync server: accounts, nested groups, versioned KDBX sync
Why: collaborative KeePass use needs one arbiter of "who wrote last" that never sees a master password, plus access control that follows an org chart. What: stdlib-only Go server. Metadata is a single JSON document with one writer and atomic commit; KDBX payloads are versioned blobs on disk. Access comes from a group tree where a grant on a group reaches every member below it. Login is password+TOTP, invite links, or OIDC through a browser-approved device flow. Pushes carry If-Match and are arbitrated by a per-database merge strategy (server-wins by default). Updates are pushed to clients over SSE. Proved: go test ./internal/... covers RFC 6238 vectors, ACL inheritance and isolation, store rollback, blob pruning, every push verdict, and an end-to-end HTTP pass over login, conflict, force, read-only grants, invite redemption, TOTP enrolment, device login and the event stream. |