Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
ReactorcoremeltdownandClaude Opus 5.5 4ffc434b1b Keep server data in an encrypted database, and harden every part
Storage. The server keeps its data in SQLite (a file in the data
directory, the default) or PostgreSQL (database, KEEPORG_DATABASE_URL or
-database). Every row, the KDBX versions included, is sealed with
AES-256-GCM under a key derived from the master key and named by an HMAC.
The master key is required to start and a different one is refused. A data
directory from 0.10 or earlier is imported on first start. Several servers
may share one PostgreSQL database. Go goes to 1.26 for the pure-Go
drivers (modernc.org/sqlite, jackc/pgx).

Hardening, after an audit of the server, both clients and the deployment:
- Single sign-on approves a device only after an explicit Approve in the
  browser that started it, bound by a cookie and PKCE; identities are never
  linked by username, by verified email only when allowed, never to admins.
- Sign-in attempts are limited per address and per account, passwords are
  checked outside the store lock with uniform timing, one-time codes work
  once, and starting two-factor needs the password.
- Merge vaults bound KDF parameters, payload size and XML shape, check
  pushes before storing them, and run at most two merges at once. A version
  is written in the same transaction as its metadata.
- Tokens in URLs only on the event stream, which ends on revocation; CSP,
  frame-ancestors, no-store and HSTS; sign-in CSRF; 404 for databases
  without access; new trusted_proxies.
- Clients open only the server's approval page, keep case-variant and
  retired file names apart, never overwrite a save made during a pull,
  require https except locally, send the stream token in a header, bound
  their reads and escape notifications and terminal output.
- The .deb creates the master key, systemd is sandboxed further, nginx sets
  modern TLS and HSTS, and CI deploys from main only.

Server 0.12.0, desktop 0.6.0, Android 0.4.0 (versionCode 4).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-02 15:38:32 +01:00
ReactorcoremeltdownandClaude Opus 5.5 f8f634fbf7 Add an Account page for sign-in methods and signed-in devices
/web/account, offered to everyone, lists every browser and client signed
in as you, with when each was last used, and signs any of them out, or all
but the current one. It sets up, replaces and removes the second factor,
and holds the password form, moved from the vault page. Administrators can
sign a user out everywhere from the People page.

The API gains GET and DELETE /api/v1/auth/sessions and DELETE
/api/v1/auth/totp. Sessions are named by a digest of their token, never the
token, and record when they were last used. Replacing or removing an active
second factor now needs the password and a current code.

Server version 0.10.0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-02 15:37:47 +01:00
ReactorcoremeltdownandClaude Opus 5 81094c0228 Add the administration pages to the web interface
Running the server meant running the API by hand: invites, accounts,
groups and grants existed only as endpoints and CLI commands, so the
browser could create a vault and nothing else.

/web/groups walks the group tree and opens onto one group's members,
roles and vault access, including the grants it inherits from above and
where they come from. /web/users lists the accounts you may see, and
lets a server administrator disable, enable, clear a lost second
factor, promote, demote or delete one. /web/invites shows the
outstanding links with their use counts, issues new ones and revokes
them.

Every administrative change is now a function of the state and the
caller in admin.go, which both the JSON handlers and the forms call. The
alternative was a second copy of the permission rules behind the pages,
which would have drifted on the first change. The same move gave the API
the two verbs it was missing: DELETE /api/v1/invites/{token} and
PATCH /api/v1/users/{id}.

Account changes are server-administrator only. A group administrator
decides who reaches which vault; disabling an account or clearing
somebody's second factor reaches past the group they share. Disable and
delete revoke that account's sessions, and the three changes that would
lock the caller out are refused on their own account.

Pages go through webPage and forms through webForm, so the session and
CSRF checks cannot be forgotten on a new form. No page carries any
JavaScript.

Server 0.6.0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-30 12:32:08 +01:00