Files
ReactorcoremeltdownandClaude Opus 5.5 4ffc434b1b Keep server data in an encrypted database, and harden every part
Storage. The server keeps its data in SQLite (a file in the data
directory, the default) or PostgreSQL (database, KEEPORG_DATABASE_URL or
-database). Every row, the KDBX versions included, is sealed with
AES-256-GCM under a key derived from the master key and named by an HMAC.
The master key is required to start and a different one is refused. A data
directory from 0.10 or earlier is imported on first start. Several servers
may share one PostgreSQL database. Go goes to 1.26 for the pure-Go
drivers (modernc.org/sqlite, jackc/pgx).

Hardening, after an audit of the server, both clients and the deployment:
- Single sign-on approves a device only after an explicit Approve in the
  browser that started it, bound by a cookie and PKCE; identities are never
  linked by username, by verified email only when allowed, never to admins.
- Sign-in attempts are limited per address and per account, passwords are
  checked outside the store lock with uniform timing, one-time codes work
  once, and starting two-factor needs the password.
- Merge vaults bound KDF parameters, payload size and XML shape, check
  pushes before storing them, and run at most two merges at once. A version
  is written in the same transaction as its metadata.
- Tokens in URLs only on the event stream, which ends on revocation; CSP,
  frame-ancestors, no-store and HSTS; sign-in CSRF; 404 for databases
  without access; new trusted_proxies.
- Clients open only the server's approval page, keep case-variant and
  retired file names apart, never overwrite a save made during a pull,
  require https except locally, send the stream token in a header, bound
  their reads and escape notifications and terminal output.
- The .deb creates the master key, systemd is sandboxed further, nginx sets
  modern TLS and HSTS, and CI deploys from main only.

Server 0.12.0, desktop 0.6.0, Android 0.4.0 (versionCode 4).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-02 15:38:32 +01:00

348 lines
12 KiB
Go

package server
import (
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"strings"
"testing"
"cc.tiredsysadmin.keeporg/internal/store"
)
// fakeIdP is the smallest thing that behaves like an OIDC provider: a
// discovery document, an authorization endpoint that redirects straight
// back, a token endpoint and a userinfo endpoint.
type fakeIdP struct {
*httptest.Server
subject, email, username string
emailVerified bool
// tokenAuth records the client credentials the server presented.
tokenAuth [2]string
authCalls int
// challenge is the PKCE challenge of the last authorization request.
challenge string
}
func newFakeIdP(t *testing.T, subject, email, username string) *fakeIdP {
idp := &fakeIdP{subject: subject, email: email, username: username}
mux := http.NewServeMux()
idp.Server = httptest.NewServer(mux)
t.Cleanup(idp.Close)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /.well-known/openid-configuration", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{
"issuer": idp.URL,
"authorization_endpoint": idp.URL + "/authorize",
"token_endpoint": idp.URL + "/token",
"userinfo_endpoint": idp.URL + "/userinfo",
})
})
mux.HandleFunc("GET /authorize", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
idp.authCalls++
q := r.URL.Query()
if q.Get("code_challenge_method") != "S256" || q.Get("code_challenge") == "" {
http.Error(w, "PKCE required", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
idp.challenge = q.Get("code_challenge")
back, err := url.Parse(q.Get("redirect_uri"))
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "bad redirect_uri", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
rq := back.Query()
rq.Set("code", "authorization-code")
rq.Set("state", q.Get("state"))
back.RawQuery = rq.Encode()
http.Redirect(w, r, back.String(), http.StatusFound)
})
mux.HandleFunc("POST /token", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
user, pass, _ := r.BasicAuth()
idp.tokenAuth = [2]string{user, pass}
_ = r.ParseForm()
if r.FormValue("code") != "authorization-code" {
http.Error(w, "bad code", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if pkceChallenge(r.FormValue("code_verifier")) != idp.challenge {
http.Error(w, "PKCE verifier does not match", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
"access_token": "an-access-token", "token_type": "Bearer", "expires_in": 300,
})
})
mux.HandleFunc("GET /userinfo", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != "Bearer an-access-token" {
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
"sub": idp.subject, "email": idp.email, "preferred_username": idp.username,
"email_verified": idp.emailVerified,
})
})
return idp
}
// withOIDC configures a harness against this provider.
func (idp *fakeIdP) withOIDC(autoCreate bool, defaultGroup string) func(*Config) {
return func(c *Config) {
c.OIDC = OIDCConfig{
Issuer: idp.URL, ClientID: "keeporg", ClientSecret: "a-client-secret",
AutoCreate: autoCreate, DefaultGroupID: defaultGroup,
}
}
}
func TestOIDCSignsInToTheWebInterface(t *testing.T) {
idp := newFakeIdP(t, "subject-1", "sso@example.com", "ssouser")
h := newHarnessWith(t, idp.withOIDC(true, "everyone"))
b := newBrowser(t, h)
// The sign-in page offers it, and following that link is the whole flow.
status, page := b.get("/web")
if status != http.StatusOK || !strings.Contains(page, "/oidc/login") {
t.Fatalf("the sign-in page does not offer single sign-on:\n%s", page)
}
status, page = b.get("/oidc/login")
if status != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("oidc login: %d\n%s", status, page)
}
if !strings.Contains(page, "Your vaults") {
t.Fatalf("single sign-on did not land on the vault list:\n%s", page)
}
if b.cookie() == "" {
t.Fatal("no session cookie after signing in with single sign-on")
}
if idp.authCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("the provider's authorize endpoint was called %d times", idp.authCalls)
}
if idp.tokenAuth != [2]string{"keeporg", "a-client-secret"} {
t.Fatalf("the server authenticated to the token endpoint as %v", idp.tokenAuth)
}
// The account was provisioned, linked to the subject, and put in the
// configured group.
var linked *store.User
h.srv.Store().Read(func(st *store.State) {
linked = st.UserByOIDC(idp.URL, "subject-1")
})
if linked == nil {
t.Fatal("no account was linked to the identity")
}
if linked.Username != "ssouser" || linked.Email != "sso@example.com" {
t.Fatalf("provisioned account = %+v", linked)
}
var inGroup bool
h.srv.Store().Read(func(st *store.State) {
for _, m := range st.Memberships {
if m.UserID == linked.ID && m.GroupID == "everyone" {
inGroup = true
}
}
})
if !inGroup {
t.Fatal("the new account did not join the default group")
}
}
var noncePattern = regexp.MustCompile(`name="nonce" value="([^"]+)"`)
// startDeviceApproval starts a device login and takes a browser through
// single sign-on for it, up to the confirmation page.
func startDeviceApproval(t *testing.T, h *harness, b *browser) (start map[string]any, nonce string) {
t.Helper()
status, start := h.call("POST", "/api/v1/auth/device/start", "",
map[string]string{"label": "phone", "return_url": "keeporg://device-approved"})
if status != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("device start: %d %v", status, start)
}
status, page := b.get("/oidc/login?code=" + url.QueryEscape(start["user_code"].(string)))
if status != http.StatusOK || !strings.Contains(page, "Let a device in?") ||
!strings.Contains(page, start["user_code"].(string)) {
t.Fatalf("no confirmation page after single sign-on: %d\n%s", status, page)
}
m := noncePattern.FindStringSubmatch(page)
if m == nil {
t.Fatalf("no nonce on the confirmation page:\n%s", page)
}
return start, m[1]
}
func TestOIDCApprovesAWaitingClient(t *testing.T) {
idp := newFakeIdP(t, "subject-2", "dev@example.com", "devuser")
h := newHarnessWith(t, idp.withOIDC(true, "everyone"))
b := newBrowser(t, h)
start, nonce := startDeviceApproval(t, h, b)
poll := func() (int, map[string]any) {
return h.call("POST", "/api/v1/auth/device/poll", "",
map[string]string{"device_code": start["device_code"].(string)})
}
// Signing in at the provider is not yet an approval: one click on a
// link must never let somebody else's device in.
if status, _ := poll(); status != http.StatusAccepted {
t.Fatalf("the device was approved before the person said yes: %d", status)
}
_, page := b.post("/oidc/approve", url.Values{"nonce": {nonce}, "decision": {"approve"}})
if !strings.Contains(page, "Device approved") || !strings.Contains(page, `href="keeporg://device-approved"`) {
t.Fatalf("approval page:\n%s", page)
}
// A device approval must not also hand the browser a session cookie.
if b.cookie() != "" {
t.Fatal("approving a device set a web session cookie")
}
status, body := poll()
if status != http.StatusOK || body["token"] == "" {
t.Fatalf("poll after approval: %d %v", status, body)
}
if u := body["user"].(map[string]any); u["username"] != "devuser" {
t.Fatalf("the session belongs to %v", u["username"])
}
}
func TestOIDCDeviceApprovalCanBeRefused(t *testing.T) {
idp := newFakeIdP(t, "subject-6", "", "devuser")
h := newHarnessWith(t, idp.withOIDC(true, ""))
b := newBrowser(t, h)
start, nonce := startDeviceApproval(t, h, b)
_, page := b.post("/oidc/approve", url.Values{"nonce": {nonce}, "decision": {"deny"}})
if !strings.Contains(page, "not signed in") {
t.Fatalf("refusal page:\n%s", page)
}
if status, _ := h.call("POST", "/api/v1/auth/device/poll", "",
map[string]string{"device_code": start["device_code"].(string)}); status != http.StatusGone {
t.Fatalf("a refused device can still poll: %d", status)
}
}
// The attack: someone starts a device login and gets the victim's browser to
// the provider with that device's code. The victim's browser ends on the
// confirmation page; the approval itself cannot be posted from anywhere
// else, because it needs this browser's cookie.
func TestOIDCApprovalCannotBePostedFromAnotherBrowser(t *testing.T) {
idp := newFakeIdP(t, "subject-7", "", "devuser")
h := newHarnessWith(t, idp.withOIDC(true, ""))
victim := newBrowser(t, h)
start, nonce := startDeviceApproval(t, h, victim)
attacker := newBrowser(t, h)
_, page := attacker.post("/oidc/approve", url.Values{"nonce": {nonce}, "decision": {"approve"}})
if !strings.Contains(page, "not started in this browser") {
t.Fatalf("an approval was accepted from another browser:\n%s", page)
}
if status, _ := h.call("POST", "/api/v1/auth/device/poll", "",
map[string]string{"device_code": start["device_code"].(string)}); status != http.StatusAccepted {
t.Fatalf("the device got in: %d", status)
}
}
func TestOIDCNeverLinksByUsername(t *testing.T) {
idp := newFakeIdP(t, "subject-3", "", "admin")
h := newHarnessWith(t, idp.withOIDC(true, ""))
b := newBrowser(t, h)
b.get("/oidc/login")
h.srv.Store().Read(func(st *store.State) {
if st.Users["admin"].OIDCSubject != "" {
t.Fatal("an identity calling itself admin claimed the admin account")
}
if u := st.UserByOIDC(idp.URL, "subject-3"); u == nil || u.Username == "admin" || u.ServerAdmin {
t.Fatalf("the identity got %+v", u)
}
})
}
func TestOIDCLinksAVerifiedEmailOnlyWhenAllowed(t *testing.T) {
for _, c := range []struct {
name string
allow, verified bool
wantLinkedToBob bool
}{
{"off", false, true, false},
{"unverified", true, false, false},
{"verified", true, true, true},
} {
t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
idp := newFakeIdP(t, "subject-8", "bob@example.com", "someone-else")
idp.emailVerified = c.verified
h := newHarnessWith(t, func(cfg *Config) {
idp.withOIDC(false, "")(cfg)
cfg.OIDC.LinkVerifiedEmail = c.allow
})
_ = h.srv.Store().Update(func(st *store.State) error {
st.Users["bob"] = &store.User{ID: "bob", Username: "bob", Email: "bob@example.com", PassHash: "x"}
return nil
})
newBrowser(t, h).get("/oidc/login")
var linked bool
h.srv.Store().Read(func(st *store.State) { linked = st.Users["bob"].OIDCSubject == "subject-8" })
if linked != c.wantLinkedToBob {
t.Fatalf("linked = %v, want %v", linked, c.wantLinkedToBob)
}
})
}
}
func TestOIDCIsLinkedFromTheAccountPage(t *testing.T) {
idp := newFakeIdP(t, "subject-9", "", "anything")
h := newHarnessWith(t, idp.withOIDC(false, ""))
b := newBrowser(t, h)
csrf := b.signIn()
// Without the session's CSRF token, a link elsewhere cannot do it.
b.get("/oidc/login?link=1")
_, page := b.get("/web/account")
if !strings.Contains(page, "Link single sign-on") {
t.Fatalf("the account page does not offer linking:\n%s", page)
}
_, page = b.get("/oidc/login?link=1&csrf=" + url.QueryEscape(csrf))
if !strings.Contains(page, "single sign-on") || strings.Contains(page, "Link single sign-on") {
t.Fatalf("not linked:\n%s", page)
}
h.srv.Store().Read(func(st *store.State) {
if st.Users["admin"].OIDCSubject != "subject-9" {
t.Fatalf("admin = %+v", st.Users["admin"])
}
})
}
func TestOIDCRefusesAnUnknownIdentityWhenProvisioningIsOff(t *testing.T) {
idp := newFakeIdP(t, "subject-4", "stranger@example.com", "stranger")
h := newHarnessWith(t, idp.withOIDC(false, ""))
b := newBrowser(t, h)
_, page := b.get("/oidc/login")
if !strings.Contains(page, "no account is linked") {
t.Fatalf("an unknown identity was let in:\n%s", page)
}
if b.cookie() != "" {
t.Fatal("a session cookie was issued to an unknown identity")
}
}
func TestOIDCCallbackRejectsAnUnknownState(t *testing.T) {
idp := newFakeIdP(t, "subject-5", "", "someone")
h := newHarnessWith(t, idp.withOIDC(true, ""))
b := newBrowser(t, h)
_, page := b.get("/oidc/callback?code=authorization-code&state=not-a-real-state")
if !strings.Contains(page, "not started in this browser") {
t.Fatalf("a forged callback was accepted:\n%s", page)
}
if b.cookie() != "" {
t.Fatal("a forged callback issued a session cookie")
}
}
func TestSignInPageHidesSingleSignOnWhenItIsNotConfigured(t *testing.T) {
b := newBrowser(t, newHarness(t))
_, page := b.get("/web")
if strings.Contains(page, "oidc/login") {
t.Fatal("single sign-on is offered although no provider is configured")
}
}