Files
keeporg/docs/HANDOVER.md
T
root 0e83acb9b1 Add Android client, packaging, Makefile entrypoint and handover docs
Why: the set has to be installable and publishable, not just buildable, and
the next person needs the reasoning, not only the code.

What:
- android/: Kotlin client with no third-party dependencies. A
  DocumentsProvider publishes the mirrored databases to every file picker, so
  KeePassDX opens them as ordinary documents; closing a file it wrote
  triggers a sync. A foreground service holds the event stream open.
  Mirror.decide transcribes the Go merge table, so both platforms resolve a
  conflict identically.
- Makefile as the single entrypoint, with file targets so only what changed
  is rebuilt: host and cross builds, both .deb packages, the macOS DMG with
  its /Applications symlink, the Windows zip, the APK under its F-Droid
  publishing name, and manual-only android-publish.
- versions.mk holds one version per platform plus the Android versionCode;
  `make bump` and `make changelog` move them. Debian changelog is tracked.
- systemd units (hardened system unit for the server, user unit for the
  agent), macOS bundle and launch agent, Windows Task Scheduler job.
- docs/HANDOVER.md on architecture and every decision that shaped it,
  docs/PROTOCOL.md for the API, README for the quick start.

Proved: make check and make test-race both pass; built both .deb packages and
inspected their contents, built the Windows zip, cross-compiled all five
desktop targets, and exercised make bump. The Android module is written but
not compiled: no JDK or Android SDK in this environment, which HANDOVER.md
states plainly.
2026-10-29 16:26:33 +01:00

14 KiB

KeepOrg: developer handover

KeepOrg makes a KeePass database collaborative without changing KeePass. A server holds many KDBX files and arbitrates who wrote last; clients present each assigned database as an ordinary .kdbx file that any KeePass application can open, and synchronize it on every save.

The server never opens a database. It moves encrypted bytes and metadata about them. Master passwords and key files stay on the clients, so a compromised server leaks the ciphertext and the group structure, nothing else.

Repository map

cmd/keeporgd/          server entry point: flags, config file, bootstrap
cmd/keeporg/           desktop client: login, run, sync, status, administration
internal/store/        domain model, JSON metadata store, ACL resolution
internal/blob/         versioned KDBX payload storage on disk
internal/server/       HTTP surface: auth, OIDC, sync, admin, SSE hub, pages
internal/client/       shared client engine: API wrapper, merge policy, mirror
internal/secret/       password verifiers, tokens, identifiers
internal/totp/         RFC 6238 second factor
android/               Android client: DocumentsProvider, sync service, UI
packaging/             deb, macOS bundle and DMG, Windows zip, systemd units
scripts/               package builders, version bump, changelog
versions.mk            the one place every platform's version lives
Makefile               the only entry point for building and publishing

The three programs

Server (keeporgd)

One process, one data directory, no database engine:

  • state.json holds users, groups, memberships, databases, grants, invites, sessions and pending device logins.
  • blobs/<database-id>/<version>.kdbx holds the payloads, keeping the last 20 versions of each database.

internal/store.Store is the only writer of state.json. Every mutation runs through Update(func(*State) error), which applies the change to a private copy, writes it with write + fsync + rename, and only then publishes it. A failed mutation changes nothing, and a crash leaves either the old document or the new one.

Reads go through Read(func(*State)) under a read lock. Access decisions are pure functions over *State in internal/store/acl.go, which is why they are cheap enough to call per request and easy to test exhaustively.

Desktop client (keeporg)

keeporg run keeps a mirror directory (default ~/KeepOrg) in step with the server:

  • a rescan every two seconds notices that a KeePass application saved a file;
  • the server's event stream delivers other people's pushes immediately;
  • .keeporg-state.json in the mirror records what this device last agreed with the server for each database.

All of the synchronization policy is the pure decide() table in internal/client/decide.go. Everything else in the mirror applies the action it returns. To change behaviour, change that table and its test.

Android client

KeepOrgProvider is a DocumentsProvider, so the mirrored files appear in every file picker under "KeepOrg" and KeePassDX or Keepass2Android opens them as ordinary documents. When such an application closes a file it had open for writing, the provider triggers a synchronization pass; that is how a save reaches the server. SyncService is a foreground service that holds the event stream open so colleagues' changes arrive without opening the app.

Mirror.decide is a transcription of the Go decision table. Keep the two in step: a change to one belongs in the other in the same commit.

Access control

Groups form one tree. Two rules decide everything:

  1. A grant on a group reaches every member below it. A grant on Company applies to a member of Company/Engineering/Backend, because the member's effective group set is their own groups plus all ancestors.
  2. An administrator of a group administers everything below it. A Company admin administers Backend; a Sales admin does not.

A database is owned by one group. Administering that group means admin on the database: renaming it, changing its merge strategy, granting other groups access and deleting it. Other groups reach it only through explicit grants, with read, write or admin. A user's permission on a database is the strongest grant that reaches them. Server administrators administer everything.

Nothing is browsable. A user who has no permission on a database cannot see that it exists: the blob endpoint answers 404, not 403.

Synchronization protocol

Full endpoint reference: PROTOCOL.md. The part that matters:

GET /api/v1/databases                 what is assigned, with version and digest
GET /api/v1/databases/{id}/blob       bytes, ETag: "<version>"
PUT /api/v1/databases/{id}/blob       If-Match: "<version this edit was based on>"
GET /api/v1/events                    SSE stream of db-updated notifications

A push always states the version it was based on. If that is still current, the server stores version+1, publishes db-updated to everyone who can read the database, and prunes old versions. If it is not current, the stored merge strategy decides, and the rejection carries both the current version and the strategy so the client can resolve without another round trip.

Pushing bytes the server already holds is a no-op that answers {"unchanged": true}: a save that changed nothing does not burn a version and does not wake other clients.

Merge strategies

Set per database, changed by an administrator of the owning group (keeporg db -id <id> -strategy <name>).

Strategy Server behaviour on a stale push Client behaviour
server-wins (default) rejects with 409 conflict keeps the local save as <name>.conflict-<timestamp>.kdbx, then writes the server copy
client-wins accepts a retry carrying If-Match: * retries with force; the server copy is overwritten and kept in history
manual rejects, and refuses force writes the server copy as <name>.server-v<n>.kdbx beside the file, touches nothing, reports a conflict once

A losing save is never discarded: it is always written somewhere the user can find it. A read-only user who edits their copy gets the same treatment, with the server copy restored.

There is no entry-level merge. The server cannot perform one, because it cannot decrypt a database. A true three-way merge belongs in a client that already holds the master password; the strategy field is the hook for it, and manual is the honest behaviour until then. KeePassXC's own "Merge from database" on the two files is the current answer.

Authentication

Three ways in, one kind of credential out: an opaque bearer token stored in state.json with an expiry (90 days by default).

  • Password (POST /api/v1/auth/login), with the built-in TOTP second factor when the account has enrolled one. The server answers totp_required so a client can ask for the code without guessing.
  • Invite link. A group administrator creates one; the invitee opens it in a browser, picks a username and password, and lands in the invite's group with the invite's role.
  • Browser-approved device login, which is also how OIDC works. The client gets a short user code, the user approves it in a browser with a password or with single sign-on, and the client polls until a token appears. The same flow serves a headless desktop and an Android phone.

OIDC is implemented against the discovery document with the standard library only. The server is a confidential client: it exchanges the authorization code over TLS with the token endpoint and reads the identity from the userinfo endpoint, so there is no local JWT verification to get wrong. An identity links to an existing account by preferred_username or email, or provisions one when oidc.auto_create is set.

Decisions worth knowing

No third-party Go dependencies, no cgo. The whole server and desktop client build with CGO_ENABLED=0 from the standard library: SSE instead of a WebSocket library, crypto/pbkdf2 (new in Go 1.24) instead of an Argon2 package, 60 lines of HMAC for TOTP, html/template for the three pages. Cross-compiling to five platforms is then one go build each, and there is no dependency tree to audit for a program that guards passwords.

A JSON document instead of SQLite. The metadata is hundreds of records, never thousands: users, groups, grants. One writer with atomic rename gives durability and consistency without cgo or a migration story, and an operator can read and back up the whole server state with cat. The cost is a single node and a full rewrite per mutation. If this ever needs several servers or tens of thousands of users, replace internal/store — the rest of the code only touches it through Read, Update and the ACL functions.

A mirror directory instead of FUSE. The requirement is that a KeePass application sees a regular .kdbx file. A real file in a real directory is that, on Linux, macOS, Windows and BSD alike, with no kernel module, no WinFsp or macFUSE dependency, no cgo and nothing to break on an OS upgrade. Local writes are atomic (write + rename), so an application never reads half a database. The price is that synchronization happens on a save rather than on a write() syscall, which is exactly the granularity KDBX has anyway.

SSE instead of WebSocket. The channel only carries server-to-client notifications. SSE is a GET that survives proxies, reconnects by itself and needs no library on any of the three clients. A subscriber that falls behind is dropped rather than waited for; it reconnects and reconciles from scratch, because every notification only ever triggers a full reconcile.

Versions, not just a digest. Keeping the last 20 blobs makes a rejected push recoverable, makes "who broke the database" answerable, and costs a few megabytes.

Operating it

make deb                      # keeporg and keeporgd packages for this arch
sudo dpkg -i dist/keeporgd_*.deb
sudo nano /etc/keeporg/server.json
sudo systemctl enable --now keeporgd
sudo journalctl -u keeporgd   # the first administrator's password is logged once

On first start with an empty state the server creates the admin account and an everyone group, and logs the generated password once. Set KEEPORG_ADMIN_PASSWORD to choose it instead.

/etc/keeporg/server.json:

{
  "addr": ":8765",
  "data_dir": "/var/lib/keeporg",
  "external_url": "https://keeporg.example.com",
  "session_ttl_hours": 2160,
  "max_db_size_mb": 32,
  "oidc": {
    "issuer": "https://id.example.com/realms/main",
    "client_id": "keeporg",
    "client_secret": "...",
    "scopes": "openid profile email",
    "auto_create": false,
    "default_group_id": ""
  }
}

external_url must be what a browser sees: invite links, device approval pages and the OIDC redirect URI are built from it. Terminate TLS in front of the server, or set tls_cert and tls_key.

Back up /var/lib/keeporg. It is the whole server: state.json plus the blobs. There is nothing else to dump.

Setting up a team

keeporg login -server https://keeporg.example.com -user admin
keeporg group -create engineering -parent <everyone-id>
keeporg db -create "Engineering" -group <engineering-id>
keeporg invite -group <engineering-id> -role member -uses 5 -hours 72
keeporg grant -group <readers-id> -db <db-id> -perm read
keeporg db -id <db-id> -strategy manual

A new database has no bytes until someone saves one. Create the KDBX in your KeePass application under the exact name the server shows, inside the mirror directory; the client adopts it and pushes it as version 1.

Versioning and publishing

versions.mk is the only place a version lives, one per platform plus the Android versionCode. Binaries are stamped at build time through -ldflags -X main.Version=....

make bump PLATFORM=android PART=minor   # also increments versionCode
make changelog MSG="what changed"       # prepends to the Debian changelog

Application identifiers follow cc.tiredsysadmin.<os>.<app>: cc.tiredsysadmin.android.keeporg, .macos.keeporg, .linux.keeporg, .windows.keeporg, .bsd.keeporg, and .linux.keeporgd for the server package.

Desktop and server artifacts stay local (dist/). Android publishing is manual, never automatic:

make android          # unsigned APK, named cc.tiredsysadmin.android.keeporg_<code>.apk
make android-publish  # scp to the private F-Droid unsigned and metadata directories

Then sign and index on the repository host (fdroid publish && fdroid update).

Testing

make check      # gofmt, go vet, go test ./...
make test-race  # the same suite under the race detector

What the suite actually covers:

  • internal/totp against the RFC 6238 vectors.
  • internal/store for grant inheritance, sibling isolation, admin inheritance, cycle safety, update rollback and expiry.
  • internal/server for every push verdict as a table, and an end-to-end HTTP pass over login, stale push, forced push, idempotent push, read-only grants, invite redemption and reuse, TOTP enrolment, device login and the event stream.
  • internal/client for the decision table, and for the mirror driven against a real in-process server: adopting a local file, following a remote push, server-wins, client-wins, manual, read-only restore, server-side rename, and an update arriving over the event stream.

Known limits and the next things to do

  • One server node. The JSON store is single-writer by design. Horizontal scale means replacing internal/store.
  • No entry-level merge. See the strategies section. The pluggable place is the client, which holds the key.
  • The Android module has not been compiled in this environment (no JDK or Android SDK was available). The Gradle wrapper is deliberately not committed; run gradle wrapper --gradle-version 8.9 once, then make android. Expect to fix small things on the first build.
  • No key-file or Yubikey handling, and none needed: those live in the KeePass application.
  • Sessions are not listable or revocable individually beyond keeporg logout on the device itself. Adding GET/DELETE /api/v1/auth/sessions is a small, well-bounded job.
  • Android does not restart its watcher at boot. Add a RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED receiver if that matters more than the permission it costs.