Files
keeporg/internal/server/server.go
T
ReactorcoremeltdownandClaude Opus 5 e0977a9241
ci/woodpecker/push/build Pipeline was successful
Let an admin delete a vault, behind their own password
The web interface could create a vault and never remove one, so the only
way to undo a mistake was the CLI. There is now a Delete link on every
vault you administer, leading to a page that says what is about to go —
owner, versions stored, grants pointing at it — and asks for your
account password before it goes.

The gate is re-authentication, not a confirmation checkbox. A session
token is enough to read and write a vault; it should not be enough to
erase every version of one, because a session is what an unlocked
laptop leaves lying around. The one-time code is required too when the
account has one enrolled.

It lives in confirmDeletion, so the rule holds wherever deletion is
reachable: DELETE /api/v1/databases/{id} now takes {password, totp?}
and answers 401 without it, and keeporg db -delete prompts. That is a
breaking change to the endpoint, which is why the server goes to 0.7.0
and the desktop clients to 0.4.0.

An account that signs in only through an identity provider has no
password to type. Rather than lock those deployments out of deleting
anything, they confirm by typing the vault's exact name — the weaker
gate, and deliberately the fallback.

Deleting takes the record, its grants, every stored version and the key
a merge vault left with the server, and tells the watchers over SSE.
Copies already in people's mirror directories stay where they are: the
server stops tracking a vault, it does not reach into anybody's home
directory.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-30 12:57:02 +01:00

344 lines
12 KiB
Go

// Package server implements the KeepOrg synchronization server: accounts,
// nested groups, per-database grants, and the versioned KDBX sync endpoints.
//
// The server never opens a KDBX file. It moves opaque bytes and arbitrates
// who wrote last, which keeps the master passwords entirely on the clients.
package server
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"log"
"net/http"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
"cc.tiredsysadmin.keeporg/internal/blob"
"cc.tiredsysadmin.keeporg/internal/kdbx"
"cc.tiredsysadmin.keeporg/internal/secret"
"cc.tiredsysadmin.keeporg/internal/store"
)
// Config is the server's whole configuration surface.
type Config struct {
Addr string `json:"addr"`
DataDir string `json:"data_dir"`
ExternalURL string `json:"external_url"`
SessionTTL time.Duration `json:"session_ttl"`
MaxDBSize int64 `json:"max_db_size"`
TLSCert string `json:"tls_cert,omitempty"`
TLSKey string `json:"tls_key,omitempty"`
OIDC OIDCConfig `json:"oidc"`
// MasterKeyFile holds the key that wraps the vault keys the server keeps
// in order to merge. It belongs outside DataDir: a copy of the data
// directory alone must not be enough to open a vault.
MasterKeyFile string `json:"master_key_file"`
// VaultKDF is the work factor of vaults this server creates. The server
// pays it three times per merge, and so does every client on every open.
VaultKDF kdbx.KDFParams `json:"vault_kdf"`
}
// Defaults fills in every value a deployment may leave unset.
func (c *Config) Defaults() {
if c.Addr == "" {
c.Addr = ":8765"
}
if c.DataDir == "" {
c.DataDir = "/var/lib/keeporg"
}
if c.ExternalURL == "" {
c.ExternalURL = "http://localhost" + c.Addr
}
c.ExternalURL = strings.TrimRight(c.ExternalURL, "/")
if c.SessionTTL == 0 {
c.SessionTTL = 90 * 24 * time.Hour
}
if c.MaxDBSize == 0 {
c.MaxDBSize = 32 << 20
}
if c.MasterKeyFile == "" {
c.MasterKeyFile = "/etc/keeporg/master.key"
}
if c.VaultKDF.MemoryKiB == 0 {
c.VaultKDF = kdbx.DefaultKDF
}
}
type Server struct {
cfg Config
st *store.Store
blobs *blob.Store
hub *Hub
oidc *oidcProvider
keyring *secret.Keyring
mux *http.ServeMux
log *log.Logger
}
// New opens the server's data directory and wires up its routes.
func New(cfg Config, lg *log.Logger) (*Server, error) {
cfg.Defaults()
st, err := store.Open(filepath.Join(cfg.DataDir, "state.json"))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
blobs, err := blob.Open(filepath.Join(cfg.DataDir, "blobs"))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s := &Server{cfg: cfg, st: st, blobs: blobs, hub: NewHub(), mux: http.NewServeMux(), log: lg}
// Without a master key the server still serves every strategy that does
// not need to read a vault; only merging and vault creation are refused.
if kr, kerr := secret.LoadKeyring(cfg.MasterKeyFile); kerr != nil {
lg.Printf("no master key, so this server cannot create or merge vaults: %v", kerr)
} else {
s.keyring = kr
}
if cfg.OIDC.Enabled() {
s.oidc = newOIDCProvider(cfg.OIDC, cfg.ExternalURL+"/oidc/callback")
}
s.checkVaultKeys()
s.routes()
return s, nil
}
// checkVaultKeys reports at startup whether the master key still opens the
// vault keys in the state document. Getting this wrong is quiet and
// expensive: a container started without its master key mounted mints a new
// one, and every merge then fails one push at a time. Saying so once, at
// startup, is the difference between a puzzle and a fixable mistake.
func (s *Server) checkVaultKeys() {
var total, broken int
s.st.Read(func(st *store.State) {
for id, d := range st.Databases {
if d.WrappedKey == "" {
continue
}
total++
if s.keyring == nil {
broken++
continue
}
if _, err := s.keyring.Unwrap(id, d.WrappedKey); err != nil {
broken++
}
}
})
switch {
case broken == 0 && total > 0:
s.log.Printf("%d vault keys available for merging", total)
case broken > 0:
s.log.Printf("WARNING: %d of %d stored vault keys do not open with this "+
"master key. Those vaults cannot be merged until the original key is "+
"restored ($%s, $%s, or %s). Nothing is lost: clients still open the "+
"vaults with their own passwords.",
broken, total, secret.MasterKeyEnv, secret.MasterKeyFileEnv,
s.cfg.MasterKeyFile)
}
}
// Store exposes the metadata store for bootstrap commands.
func (s *Server) Store() *store.Store { return s.st }
// Config returns the effective configuration.
func (s *Server) Config() Config { return s.cfg }
// Handler is the server's HTTP entry point.
func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler { return s.mux }
// StartHousekeeping runs periodic expiry until done is closed.
func (s *Server) StartHousekeeping(done <-chan struct{}) {
go func() {
t := time.NewTicker(time.Hour)
defer t.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-done:
return
case <-t.C:
if err := s.st.GC(time.Now()); err != nil {
s.log.Printf("housekeeping: %v", err)
}
}
}
}()
}
func (s *Server) routes() {
m := s.mux
m.HandleFunc("GET /healthz", s.handleHealth)
// Authentication.
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/auth/login", s.handleLogin)
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/auth/logout", s.authed(s.handleLogout))
m.HandleFunc("GET /api/v1/auth/whoami", s.authed(s.handleWhoami))
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/auth/password", s.authed(s.handleChangePassword))
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/auth/totp/enroll", s.authed(s.handleTOTPEnroll))
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/auth/totp/confirm", s.authed(s.handleTOTPConfirm))
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/auth/device/start", s.handleDeviceStart)
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/auth/device/poll", s.handleDevicePoll)
// The web interface: sign in, see your vaults, create one, and run the
// server. Every page goes through webPage and every form through
// webForm, which is where the session and the CSRF token are checked.
m.HandleFunc("GET /{$}", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(w, r, "/web", http.StatusFound)
})
m.HandleFunc("GET /web", s.handleWebHome)
m.HandleFunc("POST /web/signin", s.handleWebSignIn)
m.HandleFunc("POST /web/signout", s.webForm(s.handleWebSignOut))
m.HandleFunc("GET /web/vaults", s.webPage(s.handleWebVaults))
m.HandleFunc("POST /web/vaults", s.webForm(s.handleWebCreateVault))
m.HandleFunc("POST /web/password", s.webForm(s.handleWebChangePassword))
m.HandleFunc("GET /web/vaults/{id}/delete", s.webPage(s.handleWebDeleteVaultPage))
m.HandleFunc("POST /web/vaults/{id}/delete", s.webForm(s.handleWebDeleteVault))
m.HandleFunc("GET /web/groups", s.webPage(s.handleWebGroups))
m.HandleFunc("POST /web/groups", s.webForm(s.handleWebCreateGroup))
m.HandleFunc("GET /web/groups/{id}", s.webPage(s.handleWebGroup))
m.HandleFunc("POST /web/groups/{id}", s.webForm(s.handleWebGroupAction))
m.HandleFunc("GET /web/users", s.webPage(s.handleWebUsers))
m.HandleFunc("POST /web/users", s.webForm(s.handleWebUserAction))
m.HandleFunc("GET /web/invites", s.webPage(s.handleWebInvites))
m.HandleFunc("POST /web/invites", s.webForm(s.handleWebInviteAction))
// Browser-facing pages: device approval, invite registration, OIDC.
m.HandleFunc("GET /device", s.handleDevicePage)
m.HandleFunc("POST /device", s.handleDeviceApprove)
m.HandleFunc("GET /invite/{token}", s.handleInvitePage)
m.HandleFunc("POST /invite/{token}", s.handleInviteRedeem)
m.HandleFunc("GET /oidc/login", s.handleOIDCLogin)
m.HandleFunc("GET /oidc/callback", s.handleOIDCCallback)
// Synchronization.
m.HandleFunc("GET /api/v1/databases", s.authed(s.handleListDatabases))
m.HandleFunc("GET /api/v1/databases/{id}/blob", s.authed(s.handleGetBlob))
m.HandleFunc("PUT /api/v1/databases/{id}/blob", s.authed(s.handlePutBlob))
m.HandleFunc("GET /api/v1/events", s.authed(s.handleEvents))
// Vaults: a database the server created, and can merge.
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/vaults", s.authed(s.handleCreateVault))
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/databases/{id}/key", s.authed(s.handleSetVaultKey))
// Administration.
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/databases", s.authed(s.handleCreateDatabase))
m.HandleFunc("PATCH /api/v1/databases/{id}", s.authed(s.handlePatchDatabase))
m.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/v1/databases/{id}", s.authed(s.handleDeleteDatabase))
m.HandleFunc("GET /api/v1/groups", s.authed(s.handleListGroups))
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/groups", s.authed(s.handleCreateGroup))
m.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/v1/groups/{id}", s.authed(s.handleDeleteGroup))
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/groups/{id}/members", s.authed(s.handleSetMember))
m.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/v1/groups/{id}/members/{user}", s.authed(s.handleRemoveMember))
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/grants", s.authed(s.handleSetGrant))
m.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/v1/grants", s.authed(s.handleDeleteGrant))
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/invites", s.authed(s.handleCreateInvite))
m.HandleFunc("GET /api/v1/invites", s.authed(s.handleListInvites))
m.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/v1/invites/{token}", s.authed(s.handleRevokeInvite))
m.HandleFunc("GET /api/v1/users", s.authed(s.handleListUsers))
m.HandleFunc("PATCH /api/v1/users/{id}", s.authed(s.handlePatchUser))
}
// ---- request plumbing ----
type apiError struct {
Code string `json:"code"`
Message string `json:"error"`
}
var errUnauthorized = errors.New("unauthorized")
func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v any) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(status)
if v != nil {
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
}
}
func fail(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, code, msg string) {
writeJSON(w, status, apiError{Code: code, Message: msg})
}
func readJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, v any) bool {
dec := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 1<<20))
dec.DisallowUnknownFields()
if err := dec.Decode(v); err != nil {
fail(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", err.Error())
return false
}
return true
}
// handler is an authenticated request handler.
type handler func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request, *store.User)
// authed resolves the bearer token to a live, enabled user before calling fn.
// Per-object permission is then checked inside the handler, where the object
// being acted on is known.
func (s *Server) authed(fn handler) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
u, err := s.userFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Bearer realm="keeporg"`)
fail(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized", "invalid or expired token")
return
}
fn(w, r, u)
}
}
func (s *Server) userFromRequest(r *http.Request) (*store.User, error) {
tok := bearer(r)
if tok == "" {
return nil, errUnauthorized
}
var out *store.User
s.st.Read(func(st *store.State) {
sess := st.Sessions[tok]
if sess == nil || time.Now().After(sess.ExpiresAt) {
return
}
if u := st.Users[sess.UserID]; u != nil && !u.Disabled {
cp := *u
out = &cp
}
})
if out == nil {
return nil, errUnauthorized
}
return out, nil
}
// bearer extracts a token from the Authorization header, or from the
// access_token query parameter, which EventSource clients need because they
// cannot set headers.
func bearer(r *http.Request) string {
h := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
if after, ok := strings.CutPrefix(h, "Bearer "); ok {
return strings.TrimSpace(after)
}
return r.URL.Query().Get("access_token")
}
func (s *Server) newSession(st *store.State, userID, label string) *store.Session {
sess := &store.Session{
Token: secret.Token(),
UserID: userID,
Label: label,
CSRF: secret.Token(),
CreatedAt: time.Now(),
ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(s.cfg.SessionTTL),
}
st.Sessions[sess.Token] = sess
return sess
}
func (s *Server) handleHealth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var users, dbs int
s.st.Read(func(st *store.State) { users, dbs = len(st.Users), len(st.Databases) })
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
"status": "ok", "users": users, "databases": dbs, "streams": s.hub.Count(),
})
}