Why: the usual way to hand a secret to a container is to mount it as a file and name the path in the environment. Compose, swarm and Kubernetes all do it that way, and it keeps the key out of the process environment and off any disk the container can write. What: the master key is now looked for in KEEPORG_MASTER_KEY, then KEEPORG_MASTER_KEY_FILE, then the configured master_key_file. A secret file may hold base64, with or without padding or a trailing newline, or exactly 32 raw bytes, because secret stores produce both. Only the configured path is ever created, which is what keeps a plain package install working with no setup. The two environment variables name a key something else owns, so a missing one is reported and vault creation refused. Minting a replacement there would be worse than failing: it opens none of the existing vaults, and the mistake would otherwise surface one failed merge at a time. The compose example now provisions the key as a real secret rather than an environment variable, and the Dockerfile and README show the same. Neither names a version any more, so they stop drifting as the server is bumped. Proved: unit tests for every source and precedence, all four accepted encodings, and that a missing secret writes nothing anywhere. In real containers: a podman secret carrying base64 survives a stop and start with "1 vault keys available for merging" and merges a stale push afterwards; a secret holding 32 raw bytes creates a vault; and a secret that failed to mount is named in the startup log, with vault creation answering with the three places a key may come from.
165 lines
5.3 KiB
Go
165 lines
5.3 KiB
Go
package secret
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import (
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"crypto/aes"
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"crypto/cipher"
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"encoding/base64"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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)
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// Keyring wraps the per-vault secrets the server must keep in order to merge
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// a vault: it can decrypt a vault, so it holds that vault's key.
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//
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// The wrapped secrets live in the server's state document; the key that
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// unwraps them does not. It comes from the environment, from a secret file
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// an orchestrator provisioned, or from a file outside the data directory,
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// so a copy of the data directory alone yields ciphertext. Whoever holds
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// both holds the vaults.
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type Keyring struct {
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aead cipher.AEAD
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}
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// Environment variables that supply the master key. Both are read before
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// any configured path.
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const (
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// MasterKeyEnv holds the base64 key itself.
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MasterKeyEnv = "KEEPORG_MASTER_KEY"
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// MasterKeyFileEnv holds the path to a file containing it, which is how
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// a container runtime or an orchestrator hands over a provisioned
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// secret without putting it in the process environment.
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MasterKeyFileEnv = "KEEPORG_MASTER_KEY_FILE"
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)
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// keySize is the master key length in bytes.
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const keySize = 32
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// LoadKeyring finds the master key, in this order:
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//
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// 1. $KEEPORG_MASTER_KEY, the base64 key itself.
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// 2. $KEEPORG_MASTER_KEY_FILE, a path to a provisioned secret. It must
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// already exist: something else owns that file, so a missing one is a
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// misconfiguration to report, not a reason to mint a new key that would
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// fail to open any existing vault.
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// 3. path, from -master-key-file or master_key_file in the configuration.
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// This one is created on first run if it is absent, which is what makes
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// a plain package install work with no setup.
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//
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// A file may hold the key as base64 text, with or without a trailing
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// newline, or as exactly 32 raw bytes, because secret stores produce both.
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func LoadKeyring(path string) (*Keyring, error) {
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if v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(MasterKeyEnv)); v != "" {
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key, err := decodeKey([]byte(v))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("secret: $%s: %w", MasterKeyEnv, err)
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}
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return NewKeyring(key)
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}
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if p := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(MasterKeyFileEnv)); p != "" {
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b, err := os.ReadFile(p)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("secret: $%s points at %s: %w",
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MasterKeyFileEnv, p, err)
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}
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key, err := decodeKey(b)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("secret: $%s file %s: %w", MasterKeyFileEnv, p, err)
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}
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return NewKeyring(key)
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}
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if path == "" {
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return nil, errors.New("secret: no master key: set $" + MasterKeyEnv +
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", $" + MasterKeyFileEnv + ", or configure master_key_file")
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}
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b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
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switch {
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case err == nil:
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key, derr := decodeKey(b)
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if derr != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("secret: master key file %s: %w", path, derr)
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}
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return NewKeyring(key)
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case !os.IsNotExist(err):
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return nil, err
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}
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// First run: mint one. It is written with owner-only permissions and is
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// the one file an operator must back up separately from the data.
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key := randBytes(keySize)
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if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o700); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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enc := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(key)
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if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(enc+"\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("secret: write master key %s: %w", path, err)
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}
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return NewKeyring(key)
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}
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// decodeKey accepts the shapes a provisioned secret arrives in: exactly 32
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// raw bytes, or base64 text with or without padding and trailing newline.
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func decodeKey(b []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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if len(b) == keySize {
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return b, nil
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}
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text := strings.TrimSpace(string(b))
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if key, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(text); err == nil {
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return key, nil
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}
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if key, err := base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(text); err == nil {
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return key, nil
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}
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected %d raw bytes or a base64 key, got %d bytes "+
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"that are neither", keySize, len(b))
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}
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// NewKeyring builds a keyring from a 32-byte key.
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func NewKeyring(key []byte) (*Keyring, error) {
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if len(key) != keySize {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("secret: master key must be %d bytes, got %d",
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keySize, len(key))
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}
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block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return &Keyring{aead: aead}, nil
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}
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// Wrap encrypts a vault secret. The vault's own id is authenticated with it,
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// so a wrapped secret moved to another vault's record fails to open rather
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// than unlocking the wrong database.
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func (k *Keyring) Wrap(vaultID, plaintext string) (string, error) {
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if vaultID == "" {
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return "", errors.New("secret: wrapping needs a vault id")
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}
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nonce := randBytes(k.aead.NonceSize())
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out := k.aead.Seal(nonce, nonce, []byte(plaintext), []byte(vaultID))
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return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(out), nil
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}
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// Unwrap decrypts a vault secret wrapped for this vault.
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func (k *Keyring) Unwrap(vaultID, wrapped string) (string, error) {
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raw, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(wrapped)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("secret: wrapped value is not base64: %w", err)
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}
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n := k.aead.NonceSize()
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if len(raw) < n {
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return "", errors.New("secret: wrapped value is too short")
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}
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plain, err := k.aead.Open(nil, raw[:n], raw[n:], []byte(vaultID))
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if err != nil {
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return "", errors.New("secret: wrapped value does not open with this master key")
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}
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return string(plain), nil
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}
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