Files
keeporg/internal/server/server.go
T
root 9c459909c3 Take the master key from KEEPORG_MASTER_KEY_FILE
Why: the usual way to hand a secret to a container is to mount it as a file
and name the path in the environment. Compose, swarm and Kubernetes all do
it that way, and it keeps the key out of the process environment and off any
disk the container can write.

What: the master key is now looked for in KEEPORG_MASTER_KEY, then
KEEPORG_MASTER_KEY_FILE, then the configured master_key_file. A secret file
may hold base64, with or without padding or a trailing newline, or exactly
32 raw bytes, because secret stores produce both.

Only the configured path is ever created, which is what keeps a plain
package install working with no setup. The two environment variables name a
key something else owns, so a missing one is reported and vault creation
refused. Minting a replacement there would be worse than failing: it opens
none of the existing vaults, and the mistake would otherwise surface one
failed merge at a time.

The compose example now provisions the key as a real secret rather than an
environment variable, and the Dockerfile and README show the same. Neither
names a version any more, so they stop drifting as the server is bumped.

Proved: unit tests for every source and precedence, all four accepted
encodings, and that a missing secret writes nothing anywhere. In real
containers: a podman secret carrying base64 survives a stop and start with
"1 vault keys available for merging" and merges a stale push afterwards; a
secret holding 32 raw bytes creates a vault; and a secret that failed to
mount is named in the startup log, with vault creation answering with the
three places a key may come from.
2026-10-30 09:43:42 +01:00

328 lines
11 KiB
Go

// Package server implements the KeepOrg synchronization server: accounts,
// nested groups, per-database grants, and the versioned KDBX sync endpoints.
//
// The server never opens a KDBX file. It moves opaque bytes and arbitrates
// who wrote last, which keeps the master passwords entirely on the clients.
package server
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"log"
"net/http"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
"cc.tiredsysadmin.keeporg/internal/blob"
"cc.tiredsysadmin.keeporg/internal/kdbx"
"cc.tiredsysadmin.keeporg/internal/secret"
"cc.tiredsysadmin.keeporg/internal/store"
)
// Config is the server's whole configuration surface.
type Config struct {
Addr string `json:"addr"`
DataDir string `json:"data_dir"`
ExternalURL string `json:"external_url"`
SessionTTL time.Duration `json:"session_ttl"`
MaxDBSize int64 `json:"max_db_size"`
TLSCert string `json:"tls_cert,omitempty"`
TLSKey string `json:"tls_key,omitempty"`
OIDC OIDCConfig `json:"oidc"`
// MasterKeyFile holds the key that wraps the vault keys the server keeps
// in order to merge. It belongs outside DataDir: a copy of the data
// directory alone must not be enough to open a vault.
MasterKeyFile string `json:"master_key_file"`
// VaultKDF is the work factor of vaults this server creates. The server
// pays it three times per merge, and so does every client on every open.
VaultKDF kdbx.KDFParams `json:"vault_kdf"`
}
// Defaults fills in every value a deployment may leave unset.
func (c *Config) Defaults() {
if c.Addr == "" {
c.Addr = ":8765"
}
if c.DataDir == "" {
c.DataDir = "/var/lib/keeporg"
}
if c.ExternalURL == "" {
c.ExternalURL = "http://localhost" + c.Addr
}
c.ExternalURL = strings.TrimRight(c.ExternalURL, "/")
if c.SessionTTL == 0 {
c.SessionTTL = 90 * 24 * time.Hour
}
if c.MaxDBSize == 0 {
c.MaxDBSize = 32 << 20
}
if c.MasterKeyFile == "" {
c.MasterKeyFile = "/etc/keeporg/master.key"
}
if c.VaultKDF.MemoryKiB == 0 {
c.VaultKDF = kdbx.DefaultKDF
}
}
type Server struct {
cfg Config
st *store.Store
blobs *blob.Store
hub *Hub
oidc *oidcProvider
keyring *secret.Keyring
mux *http.ServeMux
log *log.Logger
}
// New opens the server's data directory and wires up its routes.
func New(cfg Config, lg *log.Logger) (*Server, error) {
cfg.Defaults()
st, err := store.Open(filepath.Join(cfg.DataDir, "state.json"))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
blobs, err := blob.Open(filepath.Join(cfg.DataDir, "blobs"))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s := &Server{cfg: cfg, st: st, blobs: blobs, hub: NewHub(), mux: http.NewServeMux(), log: lg}
// Without a master key the server still serves every strategy that does
// not need to read a vault; only merging and vault creation are refused.
if kr, kerr := secret.LoadKeyring(cfg.MasterKeyFile); kerr != nil {
lg.Printf("no master key, so this server cannot create or merge vaults: %v", kerr)
} else {
s.keyring = kr
}
if cfg.OIDC.Enabled() {
s.oidc = newOIDCProvider(cfg.OIDC, cfg.ExternalURL+"/oidc/callback")
}
s.checkVaultKeys()
s.routes()
return s, nil
}
// checkVaultKeys reports at startup whether the master key still opens the
// vault keys in the state document. Getting this wrong is quiet and
// expensive: a container started without its master key mounted mints a new
// one, and every merge then fails one push at a time. Saying so once, at
// startup, is the difference between a puzzle and a fixable mistake.
func (s *Server) checkVaultKeys() {
var total, broken int
s.st.Read(func(st *store.State) {
for id, d := range st.Databases {
if d.WrappedKey == "" {
continue
}
total++
if s.keyring == nil {
broken++
continue
}
if _, err := s.keyring.Unwrap(id, d.WrappedKey); err != nil {
broken++
}
}
})
switch {
case broken == 0 && total > 0:
s.log.Printf("%d vault keys available for merging", total)
case broken > 0:
s.log.Printf("WARNING: %d of %d stored vault keys do not open with this "+
"master key. Those vaults cannot be merged until the original key is "+
"restored ($%s, $%s, or %s). Nothing is lost: clients still open the "+
"vaults with their own passwords.",
broken, total, secret.MasterKeyEnv, secret.MasterKeyFileEnv,
s.cfg.MasterKeyFile)
}
}
// Store exposes the metadata store for bootstrap commands.
func (s *Server) Store() *store.Store { return s.st }
// Config returns the effective configuration.
func (s *Server) Config() Config { return s.cfg }
// Handler is the server's HTTP entry point.
func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler { return s.mux }
// StartHousekeeping runs periodic expiry until done is closed.
func (s *Server) StartHousekeeping(done <-chan struct{}) {
go func() {
t := time.NewTicker(time.Hour)
defer t.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-done:
return
case <-t.C:
if err := s.st.GC(time.Now()); err != nil {
s.log.Printf("housekeeping: %v", err)
}
}
}
}()
}
func (s *Server) routes() {
m := s.mux
m.HandleFunc("GET /healthz", s.handleHealth)
// Authentication.
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/auth/login", s.handleLogin)
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/auth/logout", s.authed(s.handleLogout))
m.HandleFunc("GET /api/v1/auth/whoami", s.authed(s.handleWhoami))
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/auth/totp/enroll", s.authed(s.handleTOTPEnroll))
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/auth/totp/confirm", s.authed(s.handleTOTPConfirm))
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/auth/device/start", s.handleDeviceStart)
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/auth/device/poll", s.handleDevicePoll)
// The web interface: sign in, see your vaults, create one.
m.HandleFunc("GET /{$}", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(w, r, "/web", http.StatusFound)
})
m.HandleFunc("GET /web", s.handleWebHome)
m.HandleFunc("POST /web/signin", s.handleWebSignIn)
m.HandleFunc("POST /web/signout", s.handleWebSignOut)
m.HandleFunc("GET /web/vaults", s.handleWebVaults)
m.HandleFunc("POST /web/vaults", s.handleWebCreateVault)
// Browser-facing pages: device approval, invite registration, OIDC.
m.HandleFunc("GET /device", s.handleDevicePage)
m.HandleFunc("POST /device", s.handleDeviceApprove)
m.HandleFunc("GET /invite/{token}", s.handleInvitePage)
m.HandleFunc("POST /invite/{token}", s.handleInviteRedeem)
m.HandleFunc("GET /oidc/login", s.handleOIDCLogin)
m.HandleFunc("GET /oidc/callback", s.handleOIDCCallback)
// Synchronization.
m.HandleFunc("GET /api/v1/databases", s.authed(s.handleListDatabases))
m.HandleFunc("GET /api/v1/databases/{id}/blob", s.authed(s.handleGetBlob))
m.HandleFunc("PUT /api/v1/databases/{id}/blob", s.authed(s.handlePutBlob))
m.HandleFunc("GET /api/v1/events", s.authed(s.handleEvents))
// Vaults: a database the server created, and can merge.
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/vaults", s.authed(s.handleCreateVault))
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/databases/{id}/key", s.authed(s.handleSetVaultKey))
// Administration.
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/databases", s.authed(s.handleCreateDatabase))
m.HandleFunc("PATCH /api/v1/databases/{id}", s.authed(s.handlePatchDatabase))
m.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/v1/databases/{id}", s.authed(s.handleDeleteDatabase))
m.HandleFunc("GET /api/v1/groups", s.authed(s.handleListGroups))
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/groups", s.authed(s.handleCreateGroup))
m.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/v1/groups/{id}", s.authed(s.handleDeleteGroup))
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/groups/{id}/members", s.authed(s.handleSetMember))
m.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/v1/groups/{id}/members/{user}", s.authed(s.handleRemoveMember))
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/grants", s.authed(s.handleSetGrant))
m.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/v1/grants", s.authed(s.handleDeleteGrant))
m.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/invites", s.authed(s.handleCreateInvite))
m.HandleFunc("GET /api/v1/invites", s.authed(s.handleListInvites))
m.HandleFunc("GET /api/v1/users", s.authed(s.handleListUsers))
}
// ---- request plumbing ----
type apiError struct {
Code string `json:"code"`
Message string `json:"error"`
}
var errUnauthorized = errors.New("unauthorized")
func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v any) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(status)
if v != nil {
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
}
}
func fail(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, code, msg string) {
writeJSON(w, status, apiError{Code: code, Message: msg})
}
func readJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, v any) bool {
dec := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 1<<20))
dec.DisallowUnknownFields()
if err := dec.Decode(v); err != nil {
fail(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", err.Error())
return false
}
return true
}
// handler is an authenticated request handler.
type handler func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request, *store.User)
// authed resolves the bearer token to a live, enabled user before calling fn.
// Per-object permission is then checked inside the handler, where the object
// being acted on is known.
func (s *Server) authed(fn handler) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
u, err := s.userFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Bearer realm="keeporg"`)
fail(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized", "invalid or expired token")
return
}
fn(w, r, u)
}
}
func (s *Server) userFromRequest(r *http.Request) (*store.User, error) {
tok := bearer(r)
if tok == "" {
return nil, errUnauthorized
}
var out *store.User
s.st.Read(func(st *store.State) {
sess := st.Sessions[tok]
if sess == nil || time.Now().After(sess.ExpiresAt) {
return
}
if u := st.Users[sess.UserID]; u != nil && !u.Disabled {
cp := *u
out = &cp
}
})
if out == nil {
return nil, errUnauthorized
}
return out, nil
}
// bearer extracts a token from the Authorization header, or from the
// access_token query parameter, which EventSource clients need because they
// cannot set headers.
func bearer(r *http.Request) string {
h := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
if after, ok := strings.CutPrefix(h, "Bearer "); ok {
return strings.TrimSpace(after)
}
return r.URL.Query().Get("access_token")
}
func (s *Server) newSession(st *store.State, userID, label string) *store.Session {
sess := &store.Session{
Token: secret.Token(),
UserID: userID,
Label: label,
CSRF: secret.Token(),
CreatedAt: time.Now(),
ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(s.cfg.SessionTTL),
}
st.Sessions[sess.Token] = sess
return sess
}
func (s *Server) handleHealth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var users, dbs int
s.st.Read(func(st *store.State) { users, dbs = len(st.Users), len(st.Databases) })
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
"status": "ok", "users": users, "databases": dbs, "streams": s.hub.Count(),
})
}