keeporg/docs/HANDOVER.md

# KeepOrg: developer handover

KeepOrg makes a KeePass database collaborative without changing KeePass. A
server holds many KDBX files and arbitrates who wrote last; clients present
each assigned database as an ordinary `.kdbx` file that any KeePass
application can open, and synchronize it on every save.

There are two kinds of database here, and the difference is the whole
security model:

- **A key-less database** is one the server only ever moves. It cannot be
  opened here, so a compromised server leaks ciphertext and the group
  structure and nothing else. Conflicts are settled by picking a winner.
- **A merge vault** is one the server can open, because it keeps that
  vault's password. That is the price of folding two people's edits
  together: merging means decrypting. Whoever controls the server and its
  master key can read every merge vault on it.

Both are first-class. A deployment that wants no server-side key uses
`server-wins`, `client-wins` or `manual` and loses nothing but the merge. A
deployment that wants merging accepts that the server is now part of its
trust boundary, and should treat the host accordingly.

## Repository map

```
cmd/keeporgd/          server entry point: flags, config file, bootstrap
cmd/keeporg/           desktop client: login, run, sync, status, administration
internal/store/        domain model, JSON metadata store, ACL resolution
internal/blob/         versioned KDBX payload storage on disk
internal/kdbx/         KDBX 4 codec and the merge engine, with its own crypto
internal/server/       HTTP surface: auth, OIDC, sync, admin, SSE hub, web,
                       web administration, page templates
internal/client/       shared client engine: API wrapper, merge policy, mirror
internal/secret/       password verifiers, tokens, identifiers
internal/totp/         RFC 6238 second factor
android/               Android client: DocumentsProvider, sync service, UI
Dockerfile             the server's container image, built from scratch
packaging/             deb, macOS bundle and DMG, Windows zip, systemd units,
                       container compose example
scripts/               package builders, version bump, changelog
versions.mk            the one place every platform's version lives
Makefile               the only entry point for building and publishing
```

## The three programs

### Server (`keeporgd`)

One process, one data directory, no database engine:

- `state.json` holds users, groups, memberships, databases, grants, invites,
  sessions and pending device logins. For a merge vault it also holds that
  vault's password, encrypted under the server's master key.
- `blobs/<database-id>/<version>.kdbx` holds the payloads, keeping the last
  20 versions of each database.
- The master key itself lives **outside** the data directory, so a copy of
  the data directory alone yields ciphertext.

`internal/store.Store` is the only writer of `state.json`. Every mutation
runs through `Update(func(*State) error)`, which applies the change to a
private copy, writes it with `write` + `fsync` + `rename`, and only then
publishes it. A failed mutation changes nothing, and a crash leaves either
the old document or the new one.

Reads go through `Read(func(*State))` under a read lock. Access decisions are
pure functions over `*State` in `internal/store/acl.go`, which is why they
are cheap enough to call per request and easy to test exhaustively.

### Desktop client (`keeporg`)

`keeporg run` keeps a mirror directory (default `~/KeepOrg`) in step with the
server:

- a rescan every two seconds notices that a KeePass application saved a file;
- the server's event stream delivers other people's pushes immediately;
- `.keeporg-state.json` in the mirror records what this device last agreed
  with the server for each database.

All of the synchronization policy is the pure `decide()` table in
`internal/client/decide.go`. Everything else in the mirror applies the action
it returns. To change behaviour, change that table and its test.

### Android client

`KeepOrgProvider` is a `DocumentsProvider`, so the mirrored files appear in
every file picker under "KeepOrg" and KeePassDX or Keepass2Android opens them
as ordinary documents. When such an application closes a file it had open for
writing, the provider triggers a synchronization pass; that is how a save
reaches the server. `SyncService` is a foreground service that holds the
event stream open so colleagues' changes arrive without opening the app.

`Mirror.decide` is a transcription of the Go decision table. **Keep the two in
step**: a change to one belongs in the other in the same commit.

### The KDBX codec (`internal/kdbx`)

A real KeePass 2 implementation, because merging cannot be done on
guesswork. It reads and writes KDBX 4.0 and 4.1 with AES-256-CBC or ChaCha20
payloads, AES-KDF or Argon2d/Argon2id derivation, and the ChaCha20 inner
stream that protects individual values. ChaCha20, BLAKE2b and Argon2 are
implemented in the package: the standard library has none of them, and this
repository carries no third-party dependencies. Each is checked against its
RFC's test vectors.

Two decisions in there are worth keeping:

**The XML payload is a generic node tree, not Go structs.** A merge server
that dropped elements it did not model would silently destroy data written by
a newer KeePass. Everything unrecognised round-trips untouched, and the merge
logic reaches only into the paths it understands: UUID, Times, String,
History, Binary, DeletedObjects, Meta.

**Anything unsupported is reported, never guessed.** A KDBX 3 file, a Twofish
payload or a Salsa20 inner stream comes back as `*kdbx.ErrUnsupported`, and
the server then falls back to a non-merging strategy rather than mangling the
file.

The format is verified against the real thing: the test suite has
keepassxc-cli read, decrypt and re-save vaults this code writes, and has this
code read what KeePassXC saved.

## Access control

Groups form one tree. Two rules decide everything:

1. **A grant on a group reaches every member below it.** A grant on
   `Company` applies to a member of `Company/Engineering/Backend`, because
   the member's effective group set is their own groups plus all ancestors.
2. **An administrator of a group administers everything below it.** A
   `Company` admin administers `Backend`; a `Sales` admin does not.

A database is owned by one group. Administering that group means `admin` on
the database: renaming it, changing its merge strategy, granting other groups
access and deleting it. Other groups reach it only through explicit grants,
with `read`, `write` or `admin`. A user's permission on a database is the
strongest grant that reaches them. Server administrators administer
everything.

Nothing is browsable. A user who has no permission on a database cannot see
that it exists: the blob endpoint answers `404`, not `403`.

## Synchronization protocol

Full endpoint reference: [PROTOCOL.md](PROTOCOL.md). The part that matters:

```
GET /api/v1/databases                 what is assigned, with version and digest
GET /api/v1/databases/{id}/blob       bytes, ETag: "<version>"
PUT /api/v1/databases/{id}/blob       If-Match: "<version this edit was based on>"
GET /api/v1/events                    SSE stream of db-updated notifications
```

A push always states the version it was based on. If that is still current,
the server stores version+1, publishes `db-updated` to everyone who can read
the database, and prunes old versions. If it is not current, the stored merge
strategy decides, and the rejection carries both the current version and the
strategy so the client can resolve without another round trip.

Pushing bytes the server already holds is a no-op that answers
`{"unchanged": true}`: a save that changed nothing does not burn a version
and does not wake other clients.

### Merge strategies

Set per database, changed by an administrator of the owning group
(`keeporg db -id <id> -strategy <name>`).

| Strategy | Server behaviour on a stale push | Client behaviour |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `merge` | opens both copies in memory, folds them together, stores the result as a new version | pushes as usual, then pulls the merged result |
| `server-wins` | rejects with `409 conflict` | keeps the local save as `<name>.conflict-<timestamp>.kdbx`, then writes the server copy |
| `client-wins` | accepts a retry carrying `If-Match: *` | retries with force; the server copy is overwritten and kept in history |
| `manual` | rejects, and refuses force | writes the server copy as `<name>.server-v<n>.kdbx` beside the file, touches nothing, reports a conflict once |

`merge` is the default for a vault created through the web interface;
`server-wins` is the default for a database created without a password,
because the server has no key for it.

A losing save is never discarded: it is always written somewhere the user can
find it. A read-only user who edits their copy gets the same treatment, with
the server copy restored.

### What merging actually does

`kdbx.Merge` follows KeePass's own synchronization rules. Objects are matched
by UUID across the two copies:

- An object only one side has is added, unless the other side deleted it
  more recently than it was last modified.
- An object both sides changed is resolved by `Times/LastModificationTime`.
  The newer version wins and **the loser is filed in the entry's history**,
  so a merge never destroys an edit, it demotes one.
- A deletion applies only when it is newer than the other side's edit.
  Otherwise the edit resurrects the object and the stale deletion record is
  dropped.
- Groups keep their nesting; an object moves when the other side moved it
  more recently, by `Times/LocationChanged`.
- Database settings follow `Meta/SettingsChanged`; custom data and icons are
  unioned by key.
- Attachments are remapped from the incoming pool into the target's. An entry
  that kept its old index would silently gain the wrong file.

The ordering of objects inside a group is not merged, and neither does
KeePass reconcile it.

Where it runs: `internal/server/merge.go` decrypts the stored version and the
pushed one, merges, re-encrypts, and stores the result as a new version. The
plaintext exists only as two `kdbx.Database` values in memory for the
duration of one request; nothing is ever written to disk in the clear. If any
step fails — most often because a client changed the vault's own password, so
the stored key no longer opens it — the push is answered with
`409 merge_failed` and the client falls back to keeping its copy aside. A
failed merge never loses an edit.

**The cost.** A merge runs the vault's key derivation three times: the stored
version, the pushed version, and the re-encryption, each with a different
salt. At the default 32 MiB / 2 iterations that is roughly 150 ms and 100 MB
of transient memory per merging push. `vault_kdf` in the configuration is
the dial; a transformed-key cache would remove most of it and has not been
written.

## Key custody and encryption at rest

Three different things are encrypted here, and they are worth keeping apart:

1. **The vault contents.** Always encrypted, by KDBX itself: AES-256 under a
   key derived with Argon2d from the vault password. This is true on the
   server's disk, on every client's disk and on the wire. The server stores
   exactly the file a KeePass application would.
2. **The vault password**, for merge vaults only. Encrypted with AES-256-GCM
   under the server's master key, with the vault's own id as additional
   authenticated data, so a wrapped secret moved to another vault's record
   fails to open instead of unlocking the wrong database. It is never
   returned by the API, never logged, and never leaves the process.
3. **Account passwords.** Not stored at all; only PBKDF2-SHA256 verifiers.

The master key is looked for in three places, in order:

| Source | Shape | Created if absent |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `$KEEPORG_MASTER_KEY` | base64 | no |
| `$KEEPORG_MASTER_KEY_FILE` | a path to a provisioned secret: base64, or 32 raw bytes | no |
| `master_key_file` / `-master-key-file`, default `/etc/keeporg/master.key` | base64 | yes, mode 0600 |

Only the configured path is ever created, which is what makes a plain
package install work with no setup. The two environment variables name a key
that something else owns, so a missing one is reported rather than replaced:
minting a key in its place would open none of the existing vaults. Without
any of the three the server still runs and still serves every key-less
strategy; only vault creation and merging are refused, with a line in the
log saying so.

What this buys and what it does not:

- A stolen copy of `/var/lib/keeporg` is useless on its own. The vaults are
  ciphertext and the wrapped keys do not open without the master key.
- A stolen copy of the data directory **and** the master key opens every
  merge vault. Keep them on different media, or feed the key in through
  `KEEPORG_MASTER_KEY` from a secret manager or a systemd credential so it
  never touches the disk at all.
- Backups must cover both, separately. A backup of the data directory with no
  master key cannot be used to merge after a restore; the vaults still open
  for their users, and the keys can be stored again with
  `keeporg db -id <id> -store-password`.

## Authentication

Three ways in, one kind of credential out: an opaque bearer token stored in
`state.json` with an expiry (90 days by default).

- **Password** (`POST /api/v1/auth/login`), with the built-in TOTP second
  factor when the account has enrolled one. The server answers
  `totp_required` so a client can ask for the code without guessing.
- **Invite link.** A group administrator creates one; the invitee opens it in
  a browser, picks a username and password, and lands in the invite's group
  with the invite's role.
- **Browser-approved device login**, which is also how OIDC works. The client
  gets a short user code, the user approves it in a browser with a password
  or with single sign-on, and the client polls until a token appears. The
  same flow serves a headless desktop and an Android phone.

OIDC is implemented against the discovery document with the standard library
only. The server is a confidential client: it exchanges the authorization
code over TLS with the token endpoint and reads the identity from the
userinfo endpoint, so there is no local JWT verification to get wrong.

### Setting up OIDC

At the identity provider, register a confidential client with one redirect
URI, which is `external_url` plus `/oidc/callback`:

```
https://keeporg.example.com/oidc/callback
```

Then put the issuer and the client credentials in `/etc/keeporg/server.json`
and restart:

```json
"oidc": {
  "issuer": "https://id.example.com/realms/main",
  "client_id": "keeporg",
  "client_secret": "...",
  "scopes": "openid profile email",
  "auto_create": false,
  "default_group_id": ""
}
```

`issuer` is the base URL that answers at
`<issuer>/.well-known/openid-configuration`; everything else is read from
there. All four fields above the blank ones are required — with any of
`issuer`, `client_id` or `client_secret` missing, single sign-on is simply
not offered.

Two entry points use it, and both end at the same callback:

- **A browser**, from the link on `/web`. `/oidc/login` with no parameters
  starts a sign-in that ends in a session cookie.
- **A client**, from the device flow. `keeporg login -browser=sso` prints a
  short code; the device page at `/device?code=…` offers the same link, this
  time as `/oidc/login?code=<user code>`, and approving it releases the
  token the waiting client is polling for.

How an identity becomes an account:

1. If some account is already linked to this issuer and `sub`, that one.
2. Otherwise an unlinked local account whose username equals
   `preferred_username`, or whose email matches `email`, is linked to it.
   This is how someone invited by link later moves to single sign-on.
3. Otherwise, with `auto_create` set, a new account is provisioned and put
   in `default_group_id` when one is given. Without it, sign-in is refused
   with "no account is linked to this identity; redeem an invite link
   first", which is the setting to keep if membership should stay by
   invitation.

An account created this way has no password, so it cannot sign in with one
and cannot set one through the password form.

The whole flow is covered by tests against a stub provider in
`internal/server/oidc_test.go`, which is the quickest way to see the
expected request sequence.

## The web interface

`/web` is the browsable half of the server. It covers what a command line
does badly — creating a vault and setting its password, and the daily
administration of people — and nothing else. It never shows a vault's
contents: the server opens a vault only to merge it, and there is no entry
browsing, by design.

| Page | What it does |
| --- | --- |
| `/web/vaults` | the vaults you can reach, the create-a-vault form, your own account password |
| `/web/vaults/{id}/delete` | what deleting a vault destroys, and the password that confirms it |
| `/web/groups` | the group tree you can see, and a form to add a group inside one you administer |
| `/web/groups/{id}` | one group: members and their roles, the vaults it reaches and where that access comes from, grants given and revoked, deletion |
| `/web/users` | the accounts you may see; for a server administrator, disable, enable, clear the second factor, promote, demote, delete |
| `/web/invites` | outstanding invite links with their use counts and expiry, a form to make one, a button to revoke one |

The navigation offers the last three only to somebody who administers a
group; a plain member sees their vaults and nothing else. The group selector
only offers groups the signed-in user administers, and a user who
administers none is told so instead of being shown a form that would fail.

**One set of rules behind both interfaces.** Every administrative change is
a function in `internal/server/admin.go` taking the state and the caller —
`createGroup`, `setMember`, `setGrant`, `createInvite`, `revokeInvite`,
`adminAccount` and the rest. The JSON handlers and the HTML forms are both
thin wrappers over them. Had the pages re-implemented the checks, the two
interfaces would have drifted apart on the first change, and that drift would
have been a permission bug rather than a cosmetic one.

**Who may do what.** Group administration follows the tree: administering a
group means administering everything inside it, so the member and grant forms
appear only on groups you administer, and their selectors only offer vaults
you administer. Account changes are deliberately not part of that. They are
server administrator only: a group administrator decides who reaches which
vault, which is access, while disabling an account, clearing somebody's
second factor or deleting them reaches past the group they happen to share.
The three changes that would lock the caller out — disable, demote, delete on
their own account — are refused outright, because a server with no reachable
administrator can only be repaired with `keeporgd -reset-admin` on the host.

Browser sessions are the same session tokens the API uses, carried in a
cookie that is `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Strict`, `Path=/`, and `Secure` whenever
`external_url` is https. Every page is served through `webPage` and every
form through `webForm`: they resolve the cookie, and a form additionally has
its per-session CSRF token checked before the handler runs. A new form cannot
forget that check, because the check is not in the handler.

No page carries any JavaScript. Each control is its own small form with the
CSRF token and one action in it, which is what makes the interface work in a
locked-down browser and keeps its attack surface down to that token.

**Deleting a vault asks for the password again.** Every other control on
these pages is undoable or additive; this one erases every stored version of
a file. A live session is what an unlocked laptop leaves lying around, so the
confirmation page states what is about to go — owner, versions, grants — and
takes the administrator's own account password, plus their one-time code when
they have one. The same rule covers the API and `keeporg db -delete`, because
it lives in `confirmDeletion` rather than in the page.

An account that signs in only through an identity provider has no password to
type. Refusing those accounts would mean a deployment where nobody can delete
anything, so they confirm by typing the vault's exact name. That is a weaker
gate, and it is deliberately the fallback rather than the rule.

Deleting takes the record, the grants pointing at it, every stored version
and — for a merge vault — the key the server held. It does not touch the
copies in people's mirror directories: the server stops tracking the vault, it
does not reach into anybody's home directory. Clients are told over SSE, so
they stop expecting the file rather than discovering it at the next save.

Creating a vault is one transaction: the server builds an empty KDBX 4
database, encrypts it with the password from the form, stores it as version
1, and — for a merge vault — wraps the password under the master key. If the
state update fails, the blob is removed again, so a half-created vault cannot
be left behind.

## Decisions worth knowing

**No third-party Go dependencies, no cgo.** The whole server and desktop
client build with `CGO_ENABLED=0` from the standard library: SSE instead of a
WebSocket library, `crypto/pbkdf2` (new in Go 1.24) for account passwords,
hand-written ChaCha20, BLAKE2b and Argon2 for the KDBX format, 60 lines of
HMAC for TOTP, `html/template` for the pages.
Cross-compiling to five platforms is then one `go build` each, and there is
no dependency tree to audit for a program that guards passwords.

**A JSON document instead of SQLite.** The metadata is hundreds of records,
never thousands: users, groups, grants. One writer with atomic rename gives
durability and consistency without cgo or a migration story, and an operator
can read and back up the whole server state with `cat`. The cost is a single
node and a full rewrite per mutation. If this ever needs several servers or
tens of thousands of users, replace `internal/store` — the rest of the code
only touches it through `Read`, `Update` and the ACL functions.

**A mirror directory instead of FUSE.** The requirement is that a KeePass
application sees a regular `.kdbx` file. A real file in a real directory is
that, on Linux, macOS, Windows and BSD alike, with no kernel module, no
WinFsp or macFUSE dependency, no cgo and nothing to break on an OS upgrade.
Local writes are atomic (`write` + `rename`), so an application never reads
half a database. The price is that synchronization happens on a save rather
than on a `write()` syscall, which is exactly the granularity KDBX has
anyway.

**SSE instead of WebSocket.** The channel only carries server-to-client
notifications. SSE is a `GET` that survives proxies, reconnects by itself and
needs no library on any of the three clients. A subscriber that falls behind
is dropped rather than waited for; it reconnects and reconciles from scratch,
because every notification only ever triggers a full reconcile.

**Versions, not just a digest.** Keeping the last 20 blobs makes a rejected
push recoverable, makes "who broke the database" answerable, and costs a few
megabytes.

## Operating it

```sh
make deb                      # keeporg and keeporgd packages for this arch
sudo dpkg -i dist/keeporgd_*.deb
sudo nano /etc/keeporg/server.json
sudo systemctl enable --now keeporgd
sudo journalctl -u keeporgd   # the first administrator's password is logged once
```

### The first sign-in

On first start with an empty state the server creates the `admin` account
and an `everyone` group, and **logs the generated password once**:

```
keeporgd: created the first administrator: username "admin" password "13e4…"
          (shown once, change it or enrol TOTP now)
```

Read it with `journalctl -u keeporgd`, or `podman logs <container>`. It is
never written anywhere else: the state file holds only a PBKDF2 verifier.
Set `KEEPORG_ADMIN_PASSWORD` before the first start to choose it instead, in
which case nothing is printed. The variable is read only when the server has
no accounts at all, so leaving it set afterwards does nothing.

Change it once you are in, with `keeporg passwd`, or the form at the bottom
of `/web/vaults`. A change requires the current password, and the one-time
code when a second factor is enrolled, and signs out that account's other
sessions.

**If the password was lost**, stop the server and run:

```sh
sudo -u keeporg keeporgd -data /var/lib/keeporg -reset-admin
```

It prints a new one, clears any second factor on that account, and revokes
its sessions. The server must be stopped: a running one holds the state in
memory and would write over the change. Nothing else is touched, and no
vault is affected — account passwords and vault passwords are different
things.

`/etc/keeporg/server.json`:

```json
{
  "addr": ":8765",
  "data_dir": "/var/lib/keeporg",
  "external_url": "https://keeporg.example.com",
  "session_ttl_hours": 2160,
  "max_db_size_mb": 32,
  "master_key_file": "/etc/keeporg/master.key",
  "vault_kdf": { "memory_mb": 32, "iterations": 2, "lanes": 2 },
  "oidc": {
    "issuer": "https://id.example.com/realms/main",
    "client_id": "keeporg",
    "client_secret": "...",
    "scopes": "openid profile email",
    "auto_create": false,
    "default_group_id": ""
  }
}
```

`external_url` must be what a browser sees: invite links, device approval
pages and the OIDC redirect URI are built from it. Terminate TLS in front of
the server, or set `tls_cert` and `tls_key`.

Back up `/var/lib/keeporg` **and** `/etc/keeporg/master.key`, separately.
The data directory is the whole server: `state.json` plus the blobs. The
master key is what turns the wrapped vault keys in it back into vault
passwords; without it a restored server can still serve, but can no longer
merge.

### Setting up a team

```sh
keeporg login -server https://keeporg.example.com -user admin
keeporg group -create engineering -parent <everyone-id>
keeporg vault -create "Engineering" -group <engineering-id>   # prompts for the vault password
keeporg invite -group <engineering-id> -role member -uses 5 -hours 72
keeporg grant -group <readers-id> -db <db-id> -perm read
```

Or do all of it at `https://keeporg.example.com/web`: `/web/groups` builds
the tree and fills it, `/web/invites` issues the links, `/web/vaults` creates
the vault. The pages call the same functions these commands call.

`keeporg vault` creates the KDBX file itself, so the vault has content from
the start: it appears in every member's mirror directory and opens with the
password that was set. `keeporg db -create` is the other path — it registers
a name with no bytes, and the first client to save a KDBX of that name in its
mirror directory adopts it as version 1. A database created that way has no
key on the server, so it cannot merge until one is stored:

```sh
keeporg db -id <db-id> -store-password     # checked against the stored file
keeporg db -id <db-id> -strategy merge
keeporg db -id <db-id> -forget-password    # the server can no longer read it
```

### Running it in a container

```sh
make docker                       # keeporgd:<version>, about 9 MB
make docker-save                  # dist/keeporgd-<version>-oci.tar
```

The image is `scratch` plus the static binary and a CA bundle, running as
uid 65532. There is no shell in it, so `HEALTHCHECK` runs the binary with
`-healthcheck`, which probes `/healthz` on the configured address.
`make docker` uses podman when it is installed and docker otherwise; podman
needs `--format docker` for the image to keep its healthcheck, which the
Makefile passes.

Two directories matter, and the whole point is that they are separate:

- `/var/lib/keeporg` — state and blobs. Mount a volume.
- `/etc/keeporg` — `server.json` and, by default, the master key.

**Give the master key somewhere durable.** The best option is a provisioned
secret plus `KEEPORG_MASTER_KEY_FILE` naming where it landed, which is the
convention compose, swarm and Kubernetes all follow:
`--secret keeporg_master_key -e KEEPORG_MASTER_KEY_FILE=/run/secrets/keeporg_master_key`.
The key is then neither in the process environment nor on a disk the
container can write, and the file may hold base64 or 32 raw bytes.
`KEEPORG_MASTER_KEY` and a volume on `/etc/keeporg` also work. A container
started with none of those mints a key
into its own layer and loses it on the next `run`. That is survivable but
annoying: the vaults still open for their users, and only merging stops. The
server says so at startup —

```
WARNING: 1 of 1 stored vault keys do not open with this master key.
```

— and a merging push then answers `409 merge_failed` rather than corrupting
anything. Restore the original key and it resumes.

`packaging/docker/compose.yaml` is a worked example with `read_only`,
`cap_drop: ALL` and `no-new-privileges`; the server writes one directory and
needs no capabilities.

## Versioning and publishing

`versions.mk` is the only place a version lives, one per platform plus the
Android `versionCode`. Binaries are stamped at build time through
`-ldflags -X main.Version=...`.

```sh
make bump PLATFORM=android PART=minor   # also increments versionCode
make changelog MSG="what changed"       # prepends to the Debian changelog
```

Application identifiers follow `cc.tiredsysadmin.<os>.<app>`:
`cc.tiredsysadmin.android.keeporg`, `.macos.keeporg`, `.linux.keeporg`,
`.windows.keeporg`, `.bsd.keeporg`, and `.linux.keeporgd` for the server
package.

Desktop and server artifacts stay local (`dist/`). Android publishing is
manual, never automatic:

```sh
make android          # unsigned APK, named cc.tiredsysadmin.android.keeporg_<code>.apk
make android-lint     # kept at zero findings
make android-publish  # scp to the private F-Droid unsigned and metadata directories
```

Then sign and index on the repository host (`fdroid publish && fdroid update`).

## Testing

```sh
make check      # gofmt, go vet, go test ./...
make test-race  # the same suite under the race detector
```

What the suite actually covers:

- `internal/totp` against the RFC 6238 vectors.
- `internal/store` for grant inheritance, sibling isolation, admin
  inheritance, cycle safety, update rollback and expiry.
- `internal/server` for every push verdict as a table, and an end-to-end HTTP
  pass over login, stale push, forced push, idempotent push, read-only
  grants, invite redemption and reuse, TOTP enrolment, device login and the
  event stream.
- `internal/kdbx` for ChaCha20 (RFC 8439), BLAKE2b (RFC 7693) and all three
  Argon2 variants (RFC 9106) against their published vectors; round trips
  that preserve unknown elements; rejection of a wrong password, a flipped
  payload byte and a flipped header byte; and twelve merge cases covering
  both conflict directions with history, deletion, resurrection, nesting,
  relocation, attachment remapping, idempotence and order independence.
  Three tests drive keepassxc-cli: it reads what this code writes, this code
  reads what it writes back, and it decrypts an entry that reached a vault
  only through a merge.
- `internal/server` additionally for vault creation, two clients editing the
  same version being merged rather than refused, the newer edit of one entry
  winning, a merge failure falling back to a conflict with the stored vault
  untouched, the refusal to switch to `merge` without a stored key, and the
  web interface: cookie hardening, CSRF rejection, group scoping and that a
  vault created from the form opens with its password.
- `internal/client` for the decision table, and for the mirror driven against
  a real in-process server: adopting a local file, following a remote push,
  server-wins, client-wins, manual, read-only restore, server-side rename,
  and an update arriving over the event stream.

The Android module is checked by `make android-lint`, which is kept at zero
findings, and `make android` builds the unsigned release APK. See
[../android/README.md](../android/README.md) for its requirements, including
what an arm64 Linux build host needs.

## Known limits and the next things to do

- **One server node.** The JSON store is single-writer by design. Horizontal
  scale means replacing `internal/store`.
- **Merging requires the server to hold the vault key.** That is inherent, not
  an implementation gap: the alternative is a client-side merge, which would
  mean the pushing client fetching the server copy, merging locally and
  pushing the result. That is a worthwhile future option and would let a
  deployment keep the key off the server entirely.
- **KDBX 3 files cannot be merged.** They are reported as unsupported, not
  mangled; re-save such a file as KDBX 4 in KeePassXC, or keep it on a
  key-less strategy. Reading KDBX 3 is a contained addition: a different
  payload layout and the Salsa20 inner stream.
- **A merge vault must keep one password.** If a client changes the vault's
  own password, the server's stored key stops working and pushes come back as
  `merge_failed` until an administrator stores the new one. The server does
  not detect the change in advance.
- **Key files and hardware keys are not supported for merge vaults**, because
  the server would have to hold those too. They work fine on any key-less
  strategy, where the server never opens the file.
- **No transformed-key cache.** Each merge pays the Argon2 cost three times.
- **The Android app has never run on a device.** It compiles clean, lint
  reports no issues and the DEX carries every class the manifest names, but
  no emulator or phone was available here. The first real run is where to
  confirm the file-picker integration, the save-triggered sync and the
  foreground notification.
- **No key-file or Yubikey handling**, and none needed: those live in the
  KeePass application.
- **Sessions are not listable or revocable individually** beyond
  `keeporg logout` on the device itself. Adding `GET`/`DELETE
  /api/v1/auth/sessions` is a small, well-bounded job.
- **Android does not restart its watcher at boot.** Add a
  `RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED` receiver if that matters more than the permission
  it costs.