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keeporg/docs/PROTOCOL.md
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ReactorcoremeltdownandClaude Opus 5.5 f8f634fbf7 Add an Account page for sign-in methods and signed-in devices
/web/account, offered to everyone, lists every browser and client signed
in as you, with when each was last used, and signs any of them out, or all
but the current one. It sets up, replaces and removes the second factor,
and holds the password form, moved from the vault page. Administrators can
sign a user out everywhere from the People page.

The API gains GET and DELETE /api/v1/auth/sessions and DELETE
/api/v1/auth/totp. Sessions are named by a digest of their token, never the
token, and record when they were last used. Replacing or removing an active
second factor now needs the password and a current code.

Server version 0.10.0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-02 15:37:47 +01:00

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# KeepOrg HTTP API
Every `/api/` endpoint takes and returns JSON and needs
`Authorization: Bearer <token>`, except the login, device and invite
endpoints. Errors carry `{"code": "...", "error": "..."}`; `code` is stable
and meant to be matched on, `error` is for humans.
HTML is served at `/web` (sign in, list vaults, create one, change your
password) and at `/device`, `/invite/{token}`, `/oidc/login` and
`/oidc/callback`. `/oidc/login` with no parameters signs a browser in and
ends in a session cookie; with `?code=<user code>` it approves a waiting
client instead and ends in a token that client polls for. The web pages use the same session
tokens in a cookie that is `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Strict` and `Secure` behind
https, and every form carries a per-session CSRF token.
## Authentication
| Method | Path | Body | Answer |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| POST | `/api/v1/auth/login` | `{username, password, totp, label}` | `{token, expires_at, user}`; `401 totp_required` when a second factor is enrolled and missing, `401 totp_invalid`, `401 bad_credentials` |
| POST | `/api/v1/auth/logout` | – | revokes the calling token |
| GET | `/api/v1/auth/whoami` | – | the account and its group memberships |
| POST | `/api/v1/auth/password` | `{current_password, new_password, totp}` | changes the account password; the current one is required, and the second factor when enrolled. Every other session of that account is revoked |
| POST | `/api/v1/auth/totp/enroll` | `{password, totp}`, only when a factor is already on | `{secret, uri}`; not active until confirmed. Replacing an active factor without the password and current code is `403 reauth_required` |
| POST | `/api/v1/auth/totp/confirm` | `{code}` | `{totp_enabled: true}` |
| DELETE | `/api/v1/auth/totp` | `{password, totp}` | `{totp_enabled: false}`; `403 reauth_required`, `403 bad_credentials`, `403 totp_invalid` |
| GET | `/api/v1/auth/sessions` | – | `{sessions: [{id, label, browser, current, created_at, last_seen_at, expires_at}]}`, the caller's own |
| DELETE | `/api/v1/auth/sessions/{id}` | – | signs that session out; `404` when it is not the caller's |
| DELETE | `/api/v1/auth/sessions` | – | `{revoked: n}`: every session of the caller but this one |
| POST | `/api/v1/auth/device/start` | `{label, return_url}` | `{device_code, user_code, verification_url, interval, expires_in}`; `400` when `return_url` is not a `keeporg:` URL |
| POST | `/api/v1/auth/device/poll` | `{device_code}` | `202 {status: "pending"}`, then `200 {token, ...}` once; `410 expired` |
A device code is single use: the first successful poll consumes it.
A session `id` is a one-way digest of its token, never the token itself, so
a list of sessions cannot be used to sign in as any of them. Failed
re-authentication answers `403`, not `401`, so a client that drops its
token on `401` does not sign itself out over a mistyped password.
`last_seen_at` is refreshed at most every five minutes.
`return_url` is optional (server 0.9 and later). When it is given, the page
that ends the approval, after a password or single sign-on, carries a
"Return to KeepOrg" link to it. Only the `keeporg:` scheme is accepted, so
the page cannot be made to send anybody elsewhere. It is for a client whose
browser is a separate application, which is to say a phone; the client still
learns of the approval by polling, and the link only brings the person back.
Servers before 0.9 reject the unknown field with `400`, so a client should
retry without it.
## Synchronization
| Method | Path | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| GET | `/api/v1/databases` | `{databases: [{id, name, perm, merge_strategy, version, sha256, size, updated_at, updated_by}]}` |
| GET | `/api/v1/databases/{id}/blob` | bytes; `ETag: "<version>"`, `X-KeepOrg-SHA256`; `204` when the database has no content yet; `?version=<n>` reads a stored older version |
| PUT | `/api/v1/databases/{id}/blob` | body is the KDBX file. `If-Match` is required |
| GET | `/api/v1/events` | SSE. Accepts `?access_token=` because an event stream cannot always set headers |
### PUT semantics
`If-Match` carries the version the edit was based on, or `*` to force.
| Condition | Status | Body |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `If-Match` missing | `428 precondition_required` | – |
| version matches, bytes differ | `200` | `{version, sha256, unchanged: false}` |
| version matches, bytes identical | `200` | `{version, sha256, unchanged: true}` |
| version stale, strategy is `merge` | `200` | `{version, sha256, merged: true, merge_summary, based_on}` — the two copies were folded together and the result stored as a new version |
| version stale, strategy is `merge`, but merging failed | `409 merge_failed` | `{error, current_version, merge_strategy}`; the stored vault is untouched |
| version stale, any other strategy | `409 conflict` | `{current_version, merge_strategy}`, plus `ETag` and `X-KeepOrg-Strategy` |
| `If-Match: *`, strategy is `client-wins` | `200` | the server copy is replaced |
| `If-Match: *`, any other strategy | `409 force_not_allowed` | – |
| read-only access | `403 forbidden` | – |
| no access | `404 not_found` | a database you cannot read does not exist to you |
| larger than `max_db_size_mb` | `413 too_large` | – |
`X-KeepOrg-SHA256` on a `PUT` is optional; when present it must match the
body or the request is rejected with `400 checksum_mismatch`.
After any accepted push, compare the `sha256` in the answer with what you
sent. If they differ the server stored something else — a merge — and the
local copy must be replaced by a fresh `GET`.
### Events
```
event: db-updated
data: {"type":"db-updated","database_id":"...","name":"Team","version":7,"sha256":"...","by":"alice"}
event: db-list-changed
data: {"type":"db-list-changed","database_id":"..."}
```
`db-updated` follows an accepted push; `db-list-changed` follows a grant,
rename, strategy change or deletion. A comment line (`: keepalive`) arrives
every 25 seconds. Reconnect on any error and reconcile fully; events are
notifications, never state.
## Vaults
A vault is a database the server created and can open. Creating one is the
only way the server comes to hold a KDBX key, and the only strategy that
needs one is `merge`.
| Method | Path | Body | Needs |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| POST | `/api/v1/vaults` | `{name, owner_group_id, merge_strategy, password}` | group admin of the owner |
| POST | `/api/v1/databases/{id}/key` | `{password}` or `{forget: true}` | database admin |
`POST /api/v1/vaults` builds an empty KDBX 4 database, encrypts it with
`password`, stores it as version 1 and answers with the database view. The
password must be at least 12 characters. For `merge_strategy: "merge"`
(the default here) the password is kept, encrypted under the server's master
key; for every other strategy it is used once and forgotten. A server with no
master key refuses with `400`.
`POST /api/v1/databases/{id}/key` stores the password of a database that
already has content, after checking that it opens the stored version, which
is how an uploaded database becomes mergeable. `{"forget": true}` removes it;
that is refused while the strategy is still `merge`.
The wrapped key is never returned by any endpoint.
## Administration
Permission needed is in the last column. "Group admin" means administering
the group named or any group above it.
| Method | Path | Body / query | Needs |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| GET | `/api/v1/groups` | – | any account; lists what you can see |
| POST | `/api/v1/groups` | `{name, parent_id}` | group admin of the parent; server admin for a root group |
| DELETE | `/api/v1/groups/{id}` | – | group admin; refuses while it has children, members or databases |
| POST | `/api/v1/groups/{id}/members` | `{username or user_id, role}` | group admin |
| DELETE | `/api/v1/groups/{id}/members/{user}` | – | group admin |
| POST | `/api/v1/databases` | `{name, owner_group_id, merge_strategy}` | group admin of the owner |
| PATCH | `/api/v1/databases/{id}` | `{name?, merge_strategy?}` | database admin |
| DELETE | `/api/v1/databases/{id}` | `{password, totp?}` | database admin, re-proving their own password; deletes every stored version |
| POST | `/api/v1/grants` | `{group_id, database_id, perm}` | database admin |
| DELETE | `/api/v1/grants` | `?group_id=&database_id=` | database admin |
| POST | `/api/v1/invites` | `{group_id, role, ttl_hours, max_uses}` | group admin |
| GET | `/api/v1/invites` | – | your own invites, and those of groups you administer |
| DELETE | `/api/v1/invites/{token}` | – | whoever may see it: its creator, an admin of its group, a server admin |
| GET | `/api/v1/users` | – | yourself, plus members of groups you administer |
| PATCH | `/api/v1/users/{id}` | `{action}` | server admin |
| GET | `/healthz` | – | unauthenticated liveness |
`merge_strategy` is one of `merge`, `server-wins`, `client-wins`, `manual`.
Switching to `merge` requires a stored key and is otherwise refused with
`400`. `perm` is one of `read`, `write`, `admin`. `role` is `member` or
`admin`.
Deleting a database is the one call that asks for credentials again. A
session token is enough to read and write a vault and not enough to destroy
every version of it, so the body carries the caller's own account password,
and `totp` as well when that account has a second factor enrolled — the
server answers `401 totp_required` when it is missing. An account that signs
in only through an identity provider has no password to send and passes
`{"confirm_name": "<the database's exact name>"}` instead.
An account `action` is one of `disable`, `enable`, `promote`, `demote`,
`clear-totp` or `delete`. `disable` and `delete` also revoke every session
that account holds. The three that would lock the caller out — `disable`,
`demote`, `delete` — are refused on the caller's own account, because a
server with no reachable administrator can only be repaired with
`keeporgd -reset-admin` on the host.